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THE GROUP DYANMICS THEORY OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
 
The corporate governance debate has focused recently on 
executive compensation.  While defenders of the status quo assert that 
CEO compensation – and corporate governance generally -- is efficient, 
critics contend that boards have been captured by powerful CEOs who 
demand excessive pay unconditioned on their performance.  Both sides 
argue that the evidence garnered from CEO compensation justifies their 
positions on legal reform of corporate governance as a whole.  
Defenders of the status quo argue that the system works well as is, as 
demonstrated by the enormous success of U.S. corporations.  Critics 
concerned about managerial power propose reforms that will increase 
board’s responsiveness to shareholders, enhancing the board’s 
willingness to act as a check against untrammeled CEO power.  In this 
Article, I take as given that many forms of CEO compensation are less 
effective than they might be and explore an alternative explanation.  
Advancing a new, Group Dynamics Theory, I argue that the problems 
with CEO compensation in public corporations may be caused by the 
decision-making flaws rooted in group dynamics, particularly 
groupthink and social cascades.  Psychology, rather than economics, 
may be chiefly to blame.  I also propose a very different type of solution, 
one that targets and improves boards’ decision-making processes. 
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Introduction
Publicly held corporation.  At times, the term has evoked the 
engine at the heart of our economy, the source of jobs, income, and 
critical goods and services like food, housing and health care.  More 
recently, the phrase has sometimes possessed a darker connotation, of 
self-interest run amok, unrestrained executives stealing money from 
shareholders’ and employees’ pockets. 
 Which vision better captures the truth turns in large part on the 
success of corporate law at instilling the right incentives in corporate 
officers.  The purpose of corporate governance law is to motivate 
corporate officers – who control the corporation – to act in the interests 
of corporate shareholders, who own it.1 A growing group of legal 
scholars and commentators in the popular press contends that corporate 
law is failing in this critical task.2 The compensation of chief executive 
 
1 The separation of ownership and control in public corporations was first analyzed 
systematically by Berle & Means.  See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).  Recently, some 
commentators have begun to question the notion that corporations should pursue 
shareholders’ welfare, but shareholder primacy remains the governing law.  See, e.g., 
Jill Fisch The Role of Shareholder Primacy in Institutional Choice, (October 2004). 
Queen's Univ. Law & Economics Research Paper No. 2004-03. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=704745 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.704745.
2 The leading academic voices for this position are of course Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse 
Fried, but there are many others.  LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE (Harvard University Press 2004) (arguing that public company boards 
are dominated by CEOs and therefore pay their CEOs excessive and poorly structured 
compensation). See also George P. Baker, et al, Compensation and Incentives: 
Practice vs. Theory, 43 J FIN 593, 614 (1988) (arguing that directors fail to create 
proper executive pay arrangements); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: 
A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 61 (1992) 
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officers represents the lynchpin of this argument.3 Employers pay 
employees to induce them to work.  Smart employers structure their 
employees’ compensation so that the harder and smarter the employees 
work, the more they are paid.  Many scholars now contend that some of 
the nation’s largest employers – publicly held corporations – pay their 
most important employees regardless of their success or failure.4 Public 
company CEOs, who control inconceivable amounts of other people’s 
 
(arguing that executive compensation is excessive); Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive 
Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41BUFF. L. REV. 1, 39 (1993) 
(applying the law of small group dynamics to the relationship between the board of 
directors and the chief executive officer); DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT; HOW 
EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA 95-114 
(1993) (arguing that chief executives are overpaid); Michael B. Dorff, Softening 
Pharaoh's Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to 
Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 825-26 (2003) (evidence does not 
support link between executive ability and compensation); Melvin Avon Eisenberg, The 
Structure Of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1489-93 (1989) (CEO 
compensation practices do not align interests of managers and shareholders);  Tod Perry 
& Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or 
Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L REV 123, 145 (2000); Edward D. 
Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes and Corporate Governance,
21 PEPP. L. REV. 777, 784 (1994) (explaining that the expense of contesting a board 
election limits shareholder power to oppose management's nomination); Joel Seligman, 
A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 331 (1987) (arguing that board 
nominations by anyone other than management is “virtually impossible"); Kevin J. 
Murphy, Executive Compensation, (April 1998) Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=163914 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.163914 (reviewing the research 
on executive compensation).  The popular press also appears to have adopted this 
consensus, based on the number of articles decrying excessive CEO compensation. See, 
e.g., David Bank, Siebel’s Plan for Executive Pay Soothes a Powerful Watchdog, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL. January 21, 2005; Chad Bray, Pay Expert Calls Disney-Ovitz 
Pact Unreasonable, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, October 26, 2004; Rebecca Smith 
and Jonathan Weil, Ex-Enron Directors Reach Settlement, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, January 10, 2005; Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene: Where economists stand, 
or don’t stand on the issue of corporate scandals, N.Y. TIMES, October 28, 2004; 
Arthur Levitt Jr., Money, Money, Money, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 22, 
2004; David Olive, How do CEOs measure up? Executive compensation is up. A lot. 
Again. Is there really any value in paying big bucks to the boss? TORONTO STAR, May 
15, 2004. 
3 See Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial 
Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. Corp. L. 
255, 257 (2005) (describing the importance of executive compensation). 
4 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 121-136 (Noting that executives are 
frequently paid generous salaries and bonuses regardless of performance levels).  
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money, lack the basic financial incentive structures that most factory 
workers have.  Without these incentives, CEOs are likely to pursue their 
own interests at the shareholders’ expense. 
 Substantial evidence supports this critique.  CEO pay has grown 
by gigantic leaps in the past two decades, far outpacing inflation or the 
increases in the salaries paid to lower level workers.  As a result, while in 
the early 1980s public company CEOs earned an average of forty-two 
times what factory workers earned, now they earn some four hundred 
times as much as factory workers do.5 Perhaps even more troublingly, 
public companies increasingly pay their CEOs in ways that reward them 
regardless of the CEOs’ performance.6 Traditional stock options, for 
example, often become more valuable for reasons completely apart from 
the company’s performance.  In 2005, when oil prices climbed 
dramatically, oil company stock prices rose commensurately.  As a 
result, Ray Irani, the chief executive of Occidental Petroleum, received 
nearly $50 million in compensation that year, the vast majority of which 
came from stock options.7 John Drosdick, Sunoco’s chief executive, 
received almost $23 million, again mostly in options.8 Yet neither 
company’s chief executive caused the spike in oil prices that created 
their new wealth.  Their stories are far from unique.  Option holders 
often benefit greatly from general increases in the stock market due to an 
expanding economy or lower interest rates, factors having nothing to do 
with individual performance.  How can our most sophisticated employers 
perform so poorly at the critical task of incentivizing their most 
important employees? 
Critics of the current legal regime argue that the problem lies 
with the incentives of the board of directors.  The board has the sole 
authority to hire the CEO and negotiate his or her compensation.9 The 
board owes a fiduciary duty to represent the shareholders interests,10 but 
the critics contend that directors’ self-interest lies with the CEO, not the 
 
5 See Dorff, supra note 2, at 823. 
6 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 87-185. 
7 See J. Alex Tarquinio, Pay for Oil Chiefs Spiked Like Prices, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 
2006, at BU10. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., 8 Del. C. §141(a) (the business and affairs of every corporation is managed 
by the board); Cal. Corp. Code §300(a) (same). 
10 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
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shareholders.11 Directors realize that the CEO exercises enormous 
influence over the corporation’s slate of nominees to the board, and that 
the corporation’s candidates are almost always elected.12 Pleasing the 
CEO is therefore the key to a long directorial tenure.  As a result, the 
negotiation between the board and the CEO over the CEO’s 
compensation is not a fierce contest conducted at arms-length but a cozy 
connivance between co-conspirators.13 
This critique – often called “Managerial Power Theory” – 
contrasts with the other major theoretical approach to corporate 
governance, Optimal Contracting Theory.  Optimal Contracting Theory 
contends that corporate governance – including the process by which 
boards negotiate CEO compensation – is efficient.14 Optimal 
Contracting scholars point out that public corporations generate vast 
sums of wealth for their shareholders.  If the system was as deeply 
flawed as critics contend, they say, then how do these critics explain 
corporations’ wild success?  Optimal Contracting theorists explain 
CEOs’ rich compensation as evidence, not that boards are captured, but 
that CEO-level skills and experience are rare and valuable.  CEOs 
 
11 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 31-34; see also Bogus, supra note 2, at  37 
(arguing the board is under the CEO’s complete control); Benjamin E. Hermalin & 
Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring 
of the CEO, 88 AM ECON REV 96, 96-97 (1998) (stating that CEOs choose or approve 
of the board’s nominees); Kevin Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of 
Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 J FIN & QUANT ANAL 331, 332 (1997) 
(arguing CEOs often can choose new board members). 
12 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 25, 80-86. See also Hermalin & Weisbach, 
supra note 11, at 96-97; Hallock, supra note 11, at 332.  
13 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 80-86.  
14 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion 
and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); Daniel 
R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); 
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 
ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL 
J. ECON. 74 (1979); J.A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority 
within an Organization, 7 BELL J. ECON. 105 (1976); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic 
Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973); Steven 
Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL 
J. ECON. 55 (1979); Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?,
in M. Bruce Johnson, ed, THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 276 (McGraw Hill 
1978); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959 
(1980).  
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command large salaries for the same reason highly successful 
professional athletes and actors do:  their skills are scarce and very 
productive.  
In this Article, I propose a third alternative to explain 
corporations’ observed behavior in compensating their chief executives.  
I sidetrack the current debate between Managerial Power and Optimal 
Contracting by assuming that the current pay structures are often 
inefficient, as Managerial Power advocates contend.  I advance a new, 
Group Dynamics Theory, account of how these inefficiencies may arise.  
I argue that the problems with CEO compensation in public corporations 
may be caused by the decision-making flaws rooted in group dynamics.  
Psychology, rather than economics, may be chiefly to blame.  
Behavioral economists and social psychologists have for decades 
studied a set of behavioral phenomena – termed “groupthink” – 
stemming from membership in a cohesive group, such as a public 
corporation board of directors.  Irving Janis, the leading pioneer in the 
field, identified seven flaws that often recur in the decision-making 
processes of such groups.15 
Other group decision-making defects stem from social 
cascades.16 Social cascades form when many individuals or groups 
possess little private information regarding a decision, and therefore rely 
heavily on the actions of others to guide them.17 As a result, the early 
actions of a few individuals – whose power stems not from additional 
information or wisdom, but simply from temporal primacy – may result 
in a “cascade” effect, in which large numbers of people repeat the 
leaders’ actions.18 
These decision-making flaws provide an alternative explanation 
for many of the executive pay structure weaknesses observed by critics.  
Directors may use inefficient mechanisms to pay senior executives 
 
15 See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS 
AND FIASCOES (2nd ed. 1982 Houghton Mifflin Company).  
16 See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board:  The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1233, 1240 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups go to 
Extremes, 110 YALE L. J. 71, 82 (2000). 
17 See Sushil Bikhchandani,, et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others:  Conformity, 
Fads, and Infomrational Cascades, 12 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 151, 154 
(1998); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 82. 
18 See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 108 QUARTERLY J. 
ECON. 797, 798 (1992); Bikhchandani , supra note 17, at 154; Sunstein, supra note 16, 
at 82-84. 
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because flaws in their decision-making processes interfere with their 
selection of more efficient compensation devices.   
Under Group Dynamics Theory, the role played by CEOs is more 
ambiguous than under Managerial Power.  Executives may actively 
manipulate the process in an effort to garner greater compensation, 
taking advantage of the board’s vulnerabilities, playing a role similar to 
that outlined by Managerial Power theorists.19 Alternatively, senior 
officers may be as much victims as beneficiaries of the group’s decision 
flaws, equally unable to perceive the inefficiencies in their own 
compensation packages. 
Most Managerial Power theorists have cited the amount of 
executive compensation as evidence of a flaw in the compensation-
setting system.20 They have compared the compensation of U.S. chief 
executives to that of their European and Japanese counterparts, measured 
the astonishing growth rate of CEO pay, and pointed out that the ratio of 
CEO remuneration to workers’ salaries has dectupled since the early 
1980s.21 This strategy has serious flaws, however, in that it is rooted in 
the problematic notion that there is some objectively correct – but 
unidentifiable – pay for CEOs other than that set by the (non-existent) 
efficient market.  Recently, however, Managerial Power theorists have 
taken a great leap forward with the work of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse 
Fried.  In their groundbreaking book, Pay Without Performance: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Bebchuk and Fried 
(“BF”) turn to the structure of executive compensation, rather than the 
absolute amount, for evidence of managerial power’s impact.  BF 
analyze numerous forms of compensation commonly used in chief 
executive’s pay packages – such as stock options – and reveal the 
seriously flawed incentives such compensation mechanisms produce.22 
A truly arms-length negotiation should produce efficient payment 
schemes.23 Employers should want pay structures that produce the best 
possible work from employees.  Employees should also want such 
structures, since the employees’ improved efficiency can be exchanged 
for greater total compensation.  If CEOs’ pay packages typically are 
 
19 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 86.  
20 See, e.g., Barris, supra note 2, at 59-61; Dorff, supra note 3, at 256; Dorff, supra note 
2, at 812, 843; Perry & Zenner, supra note 2, at 145. 
21 See Dorff, supra note 2, at 821-25 (citing commentators). 
22 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 121-136.  
23 Id. at 18. 
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inefficient, then, BF contend that the fault lies at the feet of managerial 
power over directors.24 
I argue here that the pay-structure inefficiencies BF catalogue so 
aptly may have an alternative, or at least an important contributing, 
cause:  Group Dynamics Theory.  I also contend that the type of solution 
advanced by Managerial Power adherents – reducing managers’ power 
over directors – may fail unless supplemented with reforms that also 
target group dynamics. 
I should stress at the outset that I am sympathetic to Managerial 
Power as well.  Indeed, some of my own work supports the thesis.25 I
agree with Managerial Power theorists that there are deep flaws in the 
executive compensation system of public corporations, flaws in urgent 
need of repair.  The point I wish to make in this article is that although 
Managerial Power adherents make a powerful argument, one that often 
fits the observed data, theirs is not the only explanation for what we see 
in the marketplace.  I posit here an alternative explanation, based on the 
social psychology of group dynamics, that I argue fits the data equally 
well.  My intent is not to claim that my explanation is correct and theirs 
mistaken.  Rather, I contend that both explanations likely play important 
roles in producing the current state of affairs, and that we must therefore 
target the problem with solutions based on both possible explanations. 
In Part I of this Article, I briefly summarize Managerial Power’s 
argument, taking BF’s work as representative.  In Part II, I provide an 
overview of two insights from behavioral economics and social 
psychology that together provide an alternative explanation for much of 
BF’s evidence:  groupthink and social cascades.  Then, in Part III, I 
highlight the major categories of evidence BF point to in support of the 
Managerial Power thesis, and provide a Group Dynamics explanation for 
each.  In Part IV, I suggest the need to consider an altogether different 
type of reform from that proposed by Managerial Power theorists, based 
on the Group Dynamics Theory interpretation of BF’s evidence.  I also 
sketch out what proposals based on Group Dynamics Theory might look 
like, based on empirical work from social psychology.  I conclude with a 
few thoughts about future research. 
 
24 Id. at 61-64, 80-86. 
25 See Dorff, supra note 3 (presenting experimental evidence that executives’ power 
leads to excessive compensation).  
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I.  Managerial Power Theory
A.  General Principles
1.  Sources of Managerial Power
Managerial Power focuses on directors’ self-interest in 
explaining the apparent inefficiencies found in many executive 
compensation packages and the enormous amount of total executive 
compensation.26 The theory argues that directorships are highly 
desirable, lucrative, and prestigious positions, which individuals are 
eager to gain and reluctant to give up.27 In 2002, directors of the largest 
200 companies took in an average of $152,000 in annual compensation, 
and many received additional benefits as well.28 These rewards are 
particularly striking when compared to the small investment of time and 
energy that the position has historically demanded.  BF cite a study 
indicating that independent directors spend roughly 100 hours a year on 
their board duties.29 
One might think that directorships’ desirability would induce 
board members to pursue shareholders’ interests avidly, to secure 
reelection. 30 Critics argue, however, that directors wish to serve 
management’s interests, not shareholders’.31 Board elections are rarely 
contested, outside of the hostile takeover context, so the candidates 
nominated by the corporation nearly universally secure election.32 
Directors who wish to remain in office therefore need to please whoever 
determines the composition of the corporation’s slate of nominees.33 
Scholars contend that in the majority of publicly held corporations, it is 
the CEO who makes this decision, though often informally.34 Directors 
who wish to retain their positions therefore must garner the CEO’s 
 
26 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 23. 
27 Id. at 23.  
28 Id. at 23 
29 Id. at 37 
30 Id. at 25 
31 Id. at 25-27 
32 Id. at 25 
33 See supra note 11. 
34 Although formally, many boards delegate the nomination decision to a committee, 
the CEO often either sits on the committee or informally consults with its members.  
See supra note 12. 
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support for their nomination by the corporation.  Since executives are 
likely to care more about their pay than any other issue facing the board, 
self-interested board members prioritize satisfying the CEO’s desires 
over setting up an efficient compensation contract.35 
2.  Limits on Managerial Power – Outrage Costs
What then prevents CEOs from taking all of a corporation’s 
profits as compensation?  Why do shareholders end up with any 
distributions at all? 
BF posit that directors do face one constraint that prevents them 
from handing over the corporate treasury to the management team.  If 
directors are too obviously overpaying the CEO, the financial press and 
institutional shareholders will notice, and advocate for change, whether 
by amending the corporation’s bylaws to impose restrictions on 
compensation, or by voting in a new slate of directors, or advocating for 
broader changes in corporate governance law.36 These “outrage costs” 
cause directors, in league with the management team, to conceal the 
excessive compensation as best they can, often by making it seem based 
on the CEO’s performance.37 In fact, though, very little of the CEO’s 
compensation is based on his or her own success.38 
B.  Supporting Evidence
BF’s central – eminently reasonable, in my view – thesis is that a 
truly independent board would design a compensation package that 
maximized the CEO’s incentive to perform, at the lowest cost possible.39 
BF enumerate over a dozen examples of features executive 
compensation plans commonly share that they argue would not exist (at 
least not commonly) if boards negotiated efficient contracts with 
executives at arm’s length.40 These forms of compensation, BF argue, 
camouflage excessive compensation.  They appear to depend on the 
 
35 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 80-86. 
36 Id. at  67.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 121-185. 
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. at 87-189 (discussing “anomalies” in executive pay that would not exist if 
compensation were negotiated at arm’s length).  
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CEO’s success, but actually reward CEOs regardless of how well they 
perform their jobs.41 
BF’s most prominent example is the conventional stock option.  
Stock options give the holder the right to buy a set number of shares of 
the company’s stock at a predetermined “strike price.”  The strike price 
is almost always set at the stock’s market price on the day the option is 
granted.  Stock options appear to reward CEOs only when they do their 
jobs well, as measured by an increase in the company’s stock price.  
When option holders exercise their stock options, they receive the agreed 
number of shares in exchange for the strike price.  If the stock price has 
risen higher than the strike price, the holder profits to the extent of the 
difference.  If, on the other hand, the stock price remains at the same 
level or has declined, the option holders cannot make money by 
exercising the stock options.42 Stock options therefore appear to reward 
CEOs only when they have succeeded as measured by the metric that 
arguably matters most to shareholders:  the value of their stock. 
BF deconstruct the perception that traditional stock options 
reward CEOs for their work.  They point out that traditional options 
increase in value for reasons having nothing to do with any action taken 
by the CEO to improve the company’s business.  A decrease in interest 
rates, for example, or high economic growth may cause the stock market 
as a whole to rise.  The resulting increase in the value of the CEO’s stock 
options represents a windfall to the CEO, one that could easily be 
avoided.  A board driven by shareholders’ interests would presumably 
prefer to reward the CEO only for improvements in the company’s 
performance relative to its competitors.  Such a board could easily 
achieve this goal by indexing the options’ strike price to an industry 
benchmark.  Indexed options would filter out windfall gains and reward 
CEOs only for their success in running the company.   
BF argue that the near total absence of indexed options from 
CEO compensation plans provides strong evidence that boards are 
focused on rewarding their CEOs, not motivating them to perform.43 
Their arguments for other forms of compensation follow essentially the 
same structure:  since a given form of compensation is not as strictly 
performance related as it could be, it must be the product of CEOs’ 
 
41 Id. at 121-185. 
42 See Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament 
Alternative, 54 EMORY L. J. 1557, 1567 (2005) (explaining stock options). 
43 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 137-185. 
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power over their directors.  In Part III, below, I will set out some of these 
arguments in more detail.  First, though, I will describe my Group 
Dynamics Theory, and outline its alternative explanation for the 
prevalence of inefficient compensation mechanisms. 
 
II.  Group Dynamics Theory
Two phenomena of group dynamics offer an alternative 
explanation for the pay structure inefficiencies BF have analyzed:  
groupthink and social cascades.  In this section, I will briefly describe 
each of these characteristics of group decision-making and then explain 




Groupthink consists of a set of decision-making flaws 
characteristic of cohesive groups which strive for unanimity.44 To 
illustrate how groupthink works, let us begin with a hypothetical.  A 
group of disaffected third year law students decides to run as a slate to 
head the student government.  They all attended the same college and all 
agree that college was much more fun than law school.  They also all 
agree on the solution:  more parties, the kind they enjoyed so much in 
college.  The group runs on that platform and wins by a narrow margin 
in an election with a very small turnout.  They explain to themselves that 
the low turnout is a further symptom of the same problem.  Once they 
build a rich social life on campus, the student body will develop into a 
more energized community that cares more about the school.   
They plan their first party for the following Saturday night.  The 
party is exactly like the ones they threw in college, with limitless beer, 
plenty of junk food, and a very loud band.  Although fewer students 
attend than they had hoped, they consider the event largely a success, 
and assure each other that the resulting good word-of-mouth will lead to 
greater attendance at the next one.  Two weeks later, they throw another 
party.  Fewer people show up.  Although a few students tell them they 
are too old for keggers now, the clique blames the result on a midterm 
 
44 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 9-10; Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition 
and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-
Making Groups, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 489, 496-97 (1999). 
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being held that Monday in a large class.  At the third party, the crowd is 
even thinner. 
Now the group faces some difficulty.  They had counted on 
admission fees to fund the festivities.  They broke even on the first party, 
but lost so much money on the subsequent events that they lack the funds 
for any more.  They decide that poor publicity was to blame for their 
most recent failure, and decide to spend money budgeted for flying out 
the graduation speaker on one more bash.  They are certain that this time, 
the students will come.  Then they can achieve their original goals and 
make enough money to continue to fund future events (not to mention 
repay the money borrowed from the graduation budget).  Unfortunately, 
this party too is a bust.   
How could the students have made the same mistake over and 
over again?  Why did they fail to learn from the clear evidence that their 
desires were not shared by most of their colleagues? 
The answer may lie in a phenomenon of group dynamics called 
groupthink.  The researcher most closely associated with groupthink 
theory is Yale social psychologist Irving Janis.  Janis identified seven 
characteristics of groups that together cause serious group decision-
making flaws or “groupthink.”45 These include his observations that 
cohesive groups generally consider only a limited range of options, 
seldom consider the goals to be met by the decision, and rarely delve 
beyond the obvious disadvantages of the choice initially favored by the 
majority of the group.46 They tend to avoid seriously considering 
options initially opposed by the majority.47 Cohesive groups often 
forego the opportunity to consult with experts from outside the group 
who might provide data or opinions that undermine the favored option.48 
Even when confronted with contrary data, cohesive groups tend to ignore 
information that argues against the favored policy, and to highlight 
information that supports that policy.49 Finally, cohesive groups neglect 
to form contingency plans to deal with foreseeable obstacles to success.50 
Cohesion as a whole is often considered a desirable group 
characteristic.  Groups that lack cohesion may expend too much energy 
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mediating conflicts to achieve their goals.  As Donald Langevoort has 
written, “[A] plausible interpretation of board cohesion is that it rests on 
a sound intuition:  that the most productive boards are the ones where 
insiders and outsiders work cooperatively, not at odds with each other.”51 
Langevoort argues that lack of cohesion reduces trust, impedes 
communication, and complicates debate.52 Similarly, Stephen 
Bainbridge trumpets the positive value of group cohesion.53 While 
acknowledging the dangers of groupthink, Bainbridge contends that 
directors’ cohesiveness can lead to the development of positive social 
norms that enhance the boards’ ability to monitor the corporation.54 
While some cohesion is useful, too much cohesion leads to 
groupthink.55 As with the student government clique, excessive 
cohesion, combined with a lack of cognitive conflict, can produce poor 
decision-making.56 The students began with a reasonable notion, that 
their colleagues would enjoy large, college-style parties.  Unfortunately, 
the students chose only their close friends for their slate, people who 
socialized mostly with one another and who all enjoyed the same 
activities.  As a result, there was no one in the clique who began the 
process thinking that the other students at the school might have different 
preferences.  Had contrasting ideas been represented, they might have 
sparked an initial debate that left the students open to the possibility that 
they might have misjudged their classmates’ desires.  Instead, the group 
became mutually reinforcing, with each member reassuring the others 
that large parties were universally appealing.  Even as the countervailing 
evidence mounted, with each party less successful than the one before, 
the group proved unable to consider a view that conflicted with their 
strong consensus.  They found it impossible to conceive that anyone 
would feel differently, that the group’s fundamental assumptions could 
be misguided. 
 
51 Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:  Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 
799 (2001). 
52 Id. at 800. 
53 See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 38.  
54 Id. 
55 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 12-13. 
56 See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 44, at 496-97. 
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The most famous experiment demonstrating the power of social 
conformity was conducted by Samuel Asch.57 Asch presented subjects 
with three lines and asked them which best matched a line on a white 
card.58 The task was not difficult; 99% of the subjects answered the 
question correctly in the absence of experimental manipulations.59 Asch 
asked the same question, however, of solitary subjects in a group of 
experimental confederates.60 Asch’s plants were asked the question first, 
and each chose the same, incorrect, answer.61 Faced with a strong social 
consensus that contradicted their private opinions, over 70% of the 
subjects went along with the group at least once.62 
Groupthink seems likely to develop on many corporate boards.63 
Janis argued that both friendship and prestige tend to promote group 
cohesiveness.64 As he wrote, “Concurrence-seeking tendencies probably 
are stronger when high cohesiveness is based primarily on the rewards of 
being in a pleasant 'clubby' atmosphere or of gaining prestige from being 
a member of an elite group than when it is based primarily on the 
opportunity to function competently on work tasks with effective co-
workers.”65 BF and others have pointed out that directors are often 
selected on the basis of personal friendships and networking.66 Also, 
 
57See SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450-59 (Prentice-Hall Publishers 1952). 
See also Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL 
ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1995); Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity,
70 PSYCH.. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. AND APPLIED 1 (1956).  
58 See ASCH, supra SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY note 57, at 450-59; See also Sunstein, supra 
note 16, at 79; Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel 
as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1019-21 (2005).  




63 See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32; Langevoort, supra note 51, at 810-11 (boards 
naturally trend towards collegiality and hence groupthink). See also Marleen A. 
O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1261-
69 (2003) (arguing the Enron board suffered from groupthink). 
64 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 247. 
65 Id. 
66 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 31, 81. See also Barry Baysinger & Robert 
E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects 
on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 72-73 (1990); Charles M. Elson, 
Executive Compensation—A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C.L.REV. 937, 975-76 (1993); 
O’Connor, supra note 63, at 1249. See also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 37-38 
(endorsing boards generally but with the caveat that a CEO’s personal ties with board 
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directorships of public corporations are highly prestigious, which 
contributes to a sense of group competence that may inhibit directors’ 
willingness to consult outside opinions.67 
Janis also contended that a group’s lack of diversity in training 
and background contributes to groupthink.68 Public company boards 
overwhelmingly consist of white, middle-aged men from privileged 
backgrounds who have spent their careers working for large 
corporations.69 Although the board’s homogeneity contributes to the 
board’s effectiveness by facilitating communication, lack of diversity 
also reduces dissent, contributing to groupthink.70 Not surprisingly, 
then, many scholars have argued that corporate boards may be 
particularly susceptible to groupthink.71 
Groupthink may account for many of the inefficiencies in 
executive compensation BF have observed.  Organizations suffering 
from groupthink rarely consider more than a few options when faced 
with a decision, generally fail to examine the goals they seek to meet 
with the decision, and seldom consider disadvantages beyond the 
obvious of the plan initially favored by the group.72 Corporate boards’ 
failure to choose efficient modes of compensation may therefore result 
from a paucity of considered options and a failure to examine 
possibilities closely and in relation to the boards’ goals.   
The heart of BF’s argument is that many – perhaps most – of the 
forms of compensation commonly awarded to chief executives of 
publicly held corporations are inefficient; corporations could purchase 
more incentive power with less money by using other forms or changing 
some of the terms of the traditional compensation structures.73 Their 
 
members may lead to an exploitative relationship). 
67See JANIS, supra note 15, at 247. See also JAY W. LORSCH AND ELIZABETH M. 
MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES?: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 
64 (1989). 
68 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 250. 
69 See KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 10 (2003) 
(finding that in 2002, 83% of boards included a CEO or COO of another company, 
while only 44% included even one African American board member and only 17% 
included at least one Latino board member). 
70 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 250. See also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32. 
71 See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32; James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public 
Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 462-466 (2004); 
Forbes & Millken, supra note 44, at 496; O’Connor, supra note 63, at 1239. 
72 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 9-10.  
73 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 121-122, 136, 138-143. 
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critiques of the various modes of compensation, though, are often 
complex and subtle.  They are not arguments that will automatically 
occur to boards, and are not points that boards will see as obviously 
correct, even if someone raises them.  As I will discuss in some detail 
below, BF’s arguments are sharply contested, giving plenty of cover to 
CEOs to support maintaining the favorable status quo.74 
Even though BF’s arguments might prove convincing to a board 
that seriously considered them, groupthink boards are unlikely to do so 
in the face of the CEO’s opposition.  Groups subject to groupthink are 
unusually likely to follow their leader, because they perceive the leader 
as best embodying the group’s values.75 Also, group members tend to 
vote with their leader’s views in order to reduce the stress generated by 
some external threat or internal dilemma.76 Stress temporarily lowers 
self-esteem, but joining the consensus created by a respected leader can 
reduce this stress and restore self-confidence.77 Groupthink boards are 
therefore far more likely to vote with their leader, the CEO, and to 
perceive the CEO’s views to be those of the board’s majority. 
The CEO is unlikely to favor a close examination of the 
traditional compensation structures.  As BF point out, it is against the 
CEO’s interest to have pay tied closely to performance.78 CEOs would 
understandably prefer risk-free compensation.79 The board is therefore 
unlikely to seriously consider reform proposals that would impose 
significantly greater risk on the CEO, the group’s leader. The CEO plays 
a similar role under both groupthink analysis and Managerial Power, 
acting in his or her own self-interest to self-consciously manipulate the 
board.80 
One critique BF might raise to this argument is that even if 
boards have historically missed the inefficiencies of the traditional pay 
packages, BF have now brought those flaws to light.  Even boards acting 
 
74 Id. 
75 See Fanto, supra note 71, at 463-64. See also John M. Levine & Lauren B. Resnick, 
Social Foundations of Cognition, 44 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 585, 601 (1993) (pointing out 
that groupthink is particularly present in cohesive groups with strong, directing 
leaders). 
76 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 255-56. 
77 Id.
78 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
79 Id. at 17. 
80 Id. at 61-64. 
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through the miasma of groupthink ought now to understand the problems 
with these methods and act to correct them. 
But groupthink is too robust to be dispelled by a single academic 
book, even one as enormously influential as Pay Without Performance.
Cohesive groups often avoid contact with experts from outside the group 
who might provide data or opinions that undermine the favored option.81 
Even when confronted with contrary data, cohesive groups tend to ignore 
information that argues against the favored policy and to highlight 
information that supports that policy.82 In addition, the Asch 
experiments demonstrate that social pressures can induce individuals to 
make decisions they know are objectively incorrect.83 
Nevertheless, there are limits to the power of groupthink to 
produce inefficient outcomes.  Because groupthink depends on the power 
of consensus, and not self-interest, the phenomenon should have more 
difficulty producing decisions that are obviously wrong.  The Asch 
experiments asked questions with obvious correct answers.  Yet in those 
experiments, while seventy percent of the subjects who answered a series 
of questions conformed to group pressure at least once, subjects resisted 
the group’s influence and answered correctly nearly two-thirds of the 
time.84 Although Asch’s experiments demonstrate the power of 
groupthink to persuade people to vote even for clearly wrong answers, 
groupthink’s power should be at its apex when the group faces questions 
to which there is no clear, objectively correct answer.  As I will argue 
below in Part III, the inefficiencies BF identify generally fall into this 
category.85 First, though, I will discuss a second aspect of group 
dynamics, social cascades. 
B.  Social Cascades
A hypothetical may again prove useful to illustrate social 
cascades.  Imagine a law student on the first day of law school.  Suppose 
the professor begins class by asking whether the first case was correctly 
decided.  Instead of calling on a single student for the answer, however, 
the professor moves along the rows, asking each of the one hundred 
 
81 See JANIS, supra note 15, at 9-10. 
82 Id.
83 See supra, note 62. 
84 Id. 
85 See infra Part III. 
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students to respond “yes” or “no.”  The students who respond “yes” are 
asked to move to the right front corner of the room; those who answer 
“no” move to the front left.   
Our student sits in the second row.  The first three students all 
answer “yes,” and move to the right corner.  The fourth answers “no” 
and moves to the left, but then the next five students in a row answer 
“yes.”   
Remember, this is the student’s first day.  Although she read the 
case the night before and disagreed with the court’s holding (putting her 
in the “no” camp), she lacks confidence in her nascent legal judgment.  
Perhaps the other students, who have almost all answered “yes,” have a 
better understanding of the case than she has.  Also, if she is going to 
answer incorrectly, she would prefer to be part of a large group.  Being 
one of only a handful of students to give the wrong answer would be 
highly embarrassing, but there is little shame if most of the class was 
fooled.  On balance, since she has so little information of her own, she 
decides to go with the majority and answer “yes.” 
Our law student has just demonstrated the power of social 
cascades.  When people make a decision sequentially, and that decision 
is public, at some point in the chain, individuals may begin to ignore 
their private information in favor of the crowd’s views.86 This response 
may be a rational calculation that the crowd has more information than 
any single individual, as in our law student’s perception that the nearly 
unanimous judgment of her peers probably represented a more informed 
answer than her own opinion.87 
Alternatively, it may represent an attempt to preserve reputation, 
at the expense of making an incorrect decision.88 Our law student, for 
example, answered opposite to her private judgment in part out of 
concern that she risked consequences to her reputation if she answered 
differently.  Or imagine a teenager who, while in a music store with a 
group of friends, purchases a popular Gwen Stefani  CD rather than the 
less hip, but to her more interesting, Postal Service album.  Although she 
prefers The Postal Service, she fears her friends will mock (or even 
shun) her if she buys music that is out of the mainstream.  Reputation-
induced cascades in this way share many of the characteristics of 
 
86 See supra, note 17. 
87 See Banerjee, supra note 18, at 798; Bikhchandani, supra note 17, at 154. 
88 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 78. 
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groupthink, but cascades caused by lack of private information may 
respond quite differently. 
The behavior of individuals involved in social cascades may be 
rational.89 Particularly when the actor has little other information, 
following the lead of the crowd, even a crowd of strangers, may 
represent the best strategy.  If each person in the group makes an 
independent decision, based on his or her own information and ignoring 
those who preceded him or her, then the crowd’s decision should contain 
a great deal of information, the aggregation of each individual’s private 
knowledge.  Social cascades arise, however, when most people adopt the 
“follow the crowd” strategy rather than making an independent 
decision.90 When most individuals ignore their own information in favor 
of following the majority, the group’s decision contains only the 
information of the first few decision-makers.  If these pioneers happen 
all to make the same, wrong selection, the bulk of the group may fall in 
line even if the decision contradicts their own private information.91 
A famous classroom experiment designed by economists Lisa 
Anderson and Charles Holt should serve to illustrate the principle.92 
Anderson and Holt placed three balls in each of two urns, A and B.  In 
urn A, they placed two light balls and one dark ball; in urn B they placed 
two dark balls and one light ball.93 They then flipped a coin to determine 
which urn would be chosen, and poured the balls of the chosen urn into a 
third urn or cup.94 Students were then invited up in random order to 
draw a ball from the cup, replace it, and then guess which urn had been 
chosen.95 The student’s decision was publicized to the rest of the class, 
but the signal (the color of the ball drawn) remained private.96 
A student who draws a light ball from the cup should guess urn 
A, since the probability is two to one that urn A was chosen.97 
89 See supra, note 87. 
90 See Bikhchandani, supra note 17, at 154. 
91 Id. at 154-55. 
92 See Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Classroom Games:  Information Cascades,
10 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1996) (describing game); See also Lisa R. Anderson & Charles 
A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1997) 
(describing experimental results). 
93 See Anderson & Holt (1997), supra note 92, at 849. 
94 See Anderson & Holt (1996), supra note 92, at 189. 
95 See Anderson & Holt (1997), supra note 92, at 849. 
96 Id.
97 Since urn A has two light balls, and urn B only one, the odds are two to one that any 
light ball chosen came from urn A. 
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Conversely, a student who draws a dark ball from the cup should guess 
urn B, since the same odds favor that urn B was chosen.  In both cases, 
the student should be correct two-thirds of the time.98 So far, the game 
appears quite straight-forward. 
The game becomes more interesting, however, once more 
students begin to play.  Suppose that urn A is selected in the coin toss.  If 
the first student draws a light ball, and guesses urn A, and the second 
student also draws a light ball, the second student should also guess urn 
A, since the publicly available information (that the previous student had 
drawn a light ball) matches the student’s private information (that this 
student also drew a light ball).  But what if both the first and second 
students draw dark balls?  Both should select urn B:  the first student 
because a dark ball has a two to one chance of coming from urn B, and 
the second student both for that reason and because the first student’s 
choice of urn B indicates that he also drew a dark ball.  Even if the third 
student then draws a light ball, she should choose urn B.  Although her 
private information (the light ball) indicates that urn A was more likely 
the winner of the coin toss, the two previous students’ selections suggest 
that they both drew dark balls.  Since dark balls were drawn twice, and a 
light ball only once, the third student should guess urn B.99 
This is how cascades begin.100 From this point on, no matter 
what color ball each student draws, he or she should guess urn B.  The 
publicly available information (that every student before has chosen urn 
B and therefore presumably drawn a dark ball) overwhelms the privately 
available information (that this particular student may have drawn a light 
ball).  Anderson and Holt observed in their experiment that cascades 
began in 75% of the games in which they were possible, that is, when the 
first two students both drew the same color balls.101 
Social cascades may help explain some of the executive 
compensation phenomena BF noted.  For a social cascade to begin, the 
decision-makers must not possess very much private information.102 
Most board members probably fulfill this criterion when faced with 
compensation decisions.  Board members are rarely experts on executive 
compensation.  Public company directors are generally either CEOs of 
 
98 See Anderson & Holt (1997), supra note 92, at 849. 
99 Id. at 849-50. 
100 Id.  at 850. 
101 Id. at 851-52. 
102 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 76.  
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other public companies or firm lawyers, investment bankers, former 
politicians, or prominent academics.103 Most of these groups cannot be 
expected to possess much expertise on this subject.  Lawyers who work 
in law firms are accustomed to very simple compensation structures in 
their own work.  Law firms generally charge an hourly rate for their 
work, or sometimes a percentage of the recovery in litigation.  
Investment bankers are generally paid with a straight cash fee for 
advisory work, or a percentage of the deal, whether it be a securities 
offering, or the sale or acquisition of a business.  Politicians and 
academics are nearly universally compensated with a simple salary and 
benefit structure.   
 Of these groups then, only CEOs are at all likely to have a 
detailed comprehension of the incentive effect of such immensely 
complicated pay packages.  CEOs presumably understand the content of 
their own pay packages, and have a sense of the effect of the various 
components on their own incentive to act in shareholders’ interests.  But 
this intuition comes only from CEOs’ own reactions to such incentives 
and is not based on a scientific inquiry into the actual impact of different 
compensation methodologies.   
Worse, CEOs functioning as directors of another corporation can 
be expected to experience cognitive dissonance in regard to payment 
structures that they themselves enjoy.104 Payment types that are 
inefficient from shareholders’ perspectives – because they fail to 
motivate the CEO to act on their behalf – are correspondingly 
advantageous to CEOs, who are thereby left free to pursue their own 
interests.  CEOs who benefit from inefficient types of compensation 
(from the shareholders’ perspective) are therefore committed to the 
notion that such structures are beneficial to the corporation and its 
shareholders.  Admitting to themselves or their colleagues on the board 
that a form of compensation is inefficient would require them to confront 
the knowledge that they have accepted such payments themselves, at the 
expense of their shareholders.  Faced with such cognitive dissonance, 
CEOs can be expected to resist strongly any questioning of common 
compensation methods’ efficacy. 
 
103 See Dorff, supra note 3, at 265. 
104 Cognitive dissonance refers to individuals’ discomfort when their actions contradict 
their beliefs.  People tend to act to reduce their cognitive dissonance, by changing their 
beliefs to justify their behavior.  See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-31 (1957).   
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Directors’ initial ignorance in this area might not matter very 
much if they possessed the time and incentive to develop the necessary 
expertise.  But directorships are part-time positions.105 Most 
independent directors have other, very demanding positions elsewhere, 
and typically devote less than 200 hours per year to their directorial 
duties.106 Directors also lack the incentive to invest in acquiring the 
relevant information.  Directors’ compensation is generally a mix of cash 
salary, equity (whether in restricted stock or options), and benefits such 
as health insurance.107 While the equity portion of their compensation 
may help them internalize the corporation’s interests to some degree,108 
they are unlikely to own so much stock that a small difference in stock 
price would have much impact on their total wealth.  While I argue both 
here and elsewhere that the CEO’s compensation package, particularly 
its structure, can make a very large difference to the corporation’s 
success,109 the conventional wisdom is that on a per-share basis, CEO 
compensation is insignificant to the value of the stock holdings of a 
given shareholder.110 The net result, therefore, is that the board 
possesses very little private information about the effectiveness of 
different compensation types.   
 
105 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 37; Dorff, supra note 3, at 266; Lorsch & 
MacIver, supra note 67, at 23; ROBERT A. G. MONKS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 185 
(2d ed. 2001).
106 See supra note 105.  
107 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 25; Dorff, supra note 3, at 266; Elson, supra 
note 66, at n.25. 
108See Elson, supra note 66, at n.131; Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 9. This contention is 
subject to some debate. See Barris, supra note 2, at 65-66 (1992); Bebchuk & Fried, 
supra note 2, at 196; Bogus, supra note 2, at 11-13; Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections 
on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L
REV 201, 206-208 (1996); Charles A. O'Reilly et al., CEO Compensation Tournament 
and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 257, 266 (1988) 
(arguing there is only a modest positive effect); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-- 
Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
271, 275 (1999). 
109 See Dorff, supra note 3, at 259; Dorff, supra note 2, at 819. 
110See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (arguing that the amounts spent on executive 
compensation are immaterial); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive 
Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 726 (1995) (same).  
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The second criterion for a social cascade is that decisions are 
made in sequence, rather than simultaneously.111 Executive 
compensation decisions are made at different times by different 
corporations.  Chief executive positions become available for a variety of 
reasons, from planned retirements to sudden terminations.  As a result, 
CEOs’ initial hiring – and concomitant compensation negotiation – can 
take place at any time during the year.  Similarly, since CEOs are hired 
throughout the year, their contracts expire at different times.  Renewal 
discussions and decisions therefore occur at different times as well.  
Because compensation decisions are not made simultaneously, each 
board may choose to imitate the example of the companies that preceded 
it, rather than follow its own private information about the efficiency of 
various compensation structures. 
In addition, within an individual board, opinions may be 
expressed in a sequence that produces a social cascade.  If the first few 
directors to speak on an issue have private information that points in the 
same direction – information they may have received from the CEO or 
the CEO’s compensation consultant – the remaining directors may 
choose to follow their lead, despite possessing some data that point 
toward a different decision. 
The two necessary factors for a social cascade – that participants 
have little private information and that they make their decisions in 
sequence – are present in the executive compensation context.  
Individual directors rarely possess or choose to acquire much scientific 
information about the incentive effects of different compensation plans, 
and boards make their executive compensation decisions throughout the 
year, not all at once. 
A key factor in the understanding of executive compensation as 
the result of a social cascade is the role of the executive compensation 
consultant.  Most large public corporations engage a compensation 
specialist as a consultant when formulating their executive pay 
packages.112 These consultants provide a comparison study, indicating 
the amount and form of compensation similar corporations pay their own 
CEOs.113 Such comparison studies effectively provide a report on what 
 
111 See Bikhchandani, supra note 17, at 153-54; Robert J. Shiller, Conversation, 
Information, and Herd Behavior, 85 AMER. ECON. REV. 181,181-83 (1995). 
112See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 37, 70; Dorff, supra note 3, at 267; Yablon, 
supra note 108, at n.5. 
113 See Dorff, supra note 3, at 267; Yablon, supra note 108, at n.5. 
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other similarly situated boards of directors have done when faced with 
similar questions – how much should the corporation pay the CEO and 
how should the company structure the CEO’s compensation?  Although 
the preceding boards also possessed little private information about the 
effects of different incentive structures, the fact that so many boards have 
made very similar decisions – to reward the CEO lavishly and to include 
programs such as stock options, restricted stock, deferred compensation, 
and retirement benefits – is likely to induce a board to follow the crowd 
rather than investigate more deeply on its own. 
One nagging question is why consultants do not provide correct, 
statistically validated information about which compensation techniques 
provide the greatest return for shareholders.  BF’s response – that 
consultants work for the person who hires them, the CEO – may prove 
the correct one here.  Alternatively, consultants may tout the latest trend 
in compensation because they are part of a social cascade themselves (a 
cascade of consultants who follow a few leaders into error) or are the 
victims of a version of groupthink.  The inherent difficulties in obtaining 
objective measures of executive performance, separate from other 
company-specific or industry-specific factors, may also play a large role 
here.114 One example that may illustrate the scope of the problem comes 
from the recent case of Brehm v. Eisner.115 In that case, one of the most 
outspoken and well-known critics of executive compensation practices, 
Graef Crystal, was consulted about Michael Ovitz’s compensation 
package.116 Although Ovitz’s arrangement resulted in Disney paying 
him well over $100 million for about six months’ work, Crystal 
reportedly did not object to the package.117 
Consultants play a pivotal role in beginning and maintaining any 
cascade.  Consultants communicate other boards’ “moves” with respect 
to compensation.  Without consultants’ information, boards would have 
a more difficult time learning details about the structures of other 
corporations’ executive compensation packages.  Although federal 
 
114 See BOK, supra note 2, at 96. 
115 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (DE Sup. Ct. 2000) 
116 Id. at 251.  
117 Id. at 251, 260.  See also Chad Bray, Pay Expert Calls Disney-Ovitz Pact 
“Unreasonable”, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004 at B6; Bruce Orwall & Chad Bray, 
Ovitz’s Testimony on Disney Tenure Portrays a Thwarted Deal Maker, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 27, 2004, at A1. 
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securities regulations require corporations to disclose some information, 
significant aspects of compensation plans are generally missing.118 
Unlike the incentives produced by the power dynamics 
hypothesized by Managerial Power Theory, social cascades rooted in 
information externalities are fragile; they can be shattered fairly easily by 
the release of new information.119 The cascade endures only while the 
participants remain uncertain about the correct decision.  If that 
uncertainty dissipates, the rationale for relying on others’ choices – that 
we can deduce their private information by observing their actions – 
collapses.120 
To the extent inefficient payment mechanisms are sustained by 
information externality social cascades, then, they must be supported by 
rationales that are at least facially credible.  A compensation device that 
is transparently inefficient should not be the result of a social cascade.  
Even with very limited private information, directors who can easily 
perceive the problems with a mechanism should avoid it.   
A cascade rooted in reputational concerns might prove less 
vulnerable to new information, or at least to some types of new 
information.121 Remember our teenager in the music store.122 Providing 
her with objective information that the Postal Service album is much 
better than Gwen Stefani’s, and that she will enjoy it much more, is 
unlikely to shift her decision (even if aesthetics could be objectively 
determined or demonstrated).  She chose the Gwen Stefani album not 
because she thought she would prefer their music, but because she feared 
her friends would mock her if she exercised her true preferences.  New 
information would be likely to shift her choice only if it changed her 
peers’ likely reaction.  For example, if another, very popular teenager, 
one who our teenager’s friends all deferred to, told our teenager that 
Gwen Stefani was no longer hip, and that all the cool kids were listening 
to the Black Eyed Peas, our teenager might well decide to buy the Black 
Eyed Peas’ music instead.   
Reputational concerns may play some role in boards’ 
compensation decisions.  Directors seem unlikely to adopt a 
compensation mechanism that their peers at other corporations would 
 
118 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 67-68. 
119 See Bikhchandani, supra note 17, at 157-8. 
120 Id. at 151; Banerjee, supra note 18, at 798. 
121 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 78 (describing reputational cascades). 
122 See supra note 88 and surrounding text. 
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consider unorthodox or strange.  Such a decision would attract the 
attention of the financial press and display directors in a poor light, 
perhaps damaging their full-time careers and reducing their opportunities 
to serve on additional boards.   
But the reputational effects of compensation decisions seem 
vulnerable to proof of the efficiency or inefficiency of a particular 
payment mechanism.  Unlike our teenager’s ethereal goal of appearing 
cool, directors’ task is the somewhat more tangible duty to manage the 
corporation on the shareholders’ behalf.123 In the absence of some 
psychological impediment such as groupthink, directors’ peers should 
value payment mechanisms that improve the company’s prospects, and 
should laud those boards who adopt them.  Even if a payment 
mechanism is considered outré, it should readily find the group’s favor if 
evidence is presented that the device provides maximum executive 
motivation at a minimal cost.  Since directors’ peer group should care 
about actual incentive effects, and not the aesthetics or social 
acceptability of a particular approach, directors who care about their 
reputations with that group should feel similarly.  That is, directors who 
want to enhance their reputations as competent corporate stewards 
should seek out the most efficient payment mechanisms, based on the 
best available evidence, regardless of whether those methods are 
currently popular.  If they are efficient, they will quickly become 
popular, and the early adopters will be celebrated for their vision.  For 
this reason, reputation-based social cascades should not account for 
many compensation package inefficiencies.124 
If reputation-based social cascades are unlikely to produce 
compensation package inefficiencies, and if information externality-
based social cascades are vulnerable to persuasive evidence of 
 
123 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 
(Del. 1986); Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 568 (1984).  
124 There is some contrary evidence that even groups who should care only about 
efficiency may, under some conditions, stick with traditional approaches that are 
demonstrably suboptimal.  See John Coates, Explaining Variation In Takeover 
Defenses: Blame The Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301 (2001) (finding that even large, 
sophisticated law firms faced with very large transactions made poor decisions about 
whether to adopt takeover defenses that were based on tradition rather than the optimal 
choices for their clients); David Romer, Do Firms Maximize?  Evidence From 
Professional Football, available at 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/papers/PAPER_NFL_JULY05_FORWEB_CORREC
TED.pdf (last viewed on Aug. 29, 2006) at 28-33 (similar findings for professional 
football coaches).  If boards act this way, reputation concerns could cause a cascade. 
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inefficiencies, how much explanatory power can social cascades 
possess? 
Social cascades (rooted in information externalities) may explain 
many of the inefficiencies we observe if no new, persuasive information 
typically arises to collapse the cascade.  At first glance, this premise 
seems fanciful.  Literally billions of dollars are spent by public 
corporations compensating their senior management teams each year, 
representing nearly 10% of those companies’ earnings.125 Surely 
directors have an enormous incentive to research (or pay academics to 
research) whether the compensation devices that are popular are also 
efficient.   
In thinking about corporate governance problems, it is important 
to remember that directors do not always share the corporation’s 
incentives.  Even if CEOs have not captured directors, boards still retain 
certain structural flaws – such as problems of composition, incentive, 
and resources – that may prevent directors from actively pursuing the 
corporation’s best interests.126 
In the case of executive compensation, Managerial Power Theory 
asserts (correctly, I believe) that directors have little direct financial 
incentive to search for the optimal pay structure.127 The small incentive 
that does exist might suffice if it were simple to identify the most 
efficient compensation devices.  If directors had only to ask their 
consultant to receive an authoritative and correct answer, perhaps we 
would have good reason to doubt that social cascades form in this area.   
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to determine which structures 
are efficient.  Many of the devices BF aptly criticize appear at first blush 
to be highly efficient and have been lauded by sophisticated (and 
presumably impartial) academics.  For example, stock options, which BF 
lambaste as, inter alia, rewarding executives for general increases in the 
stock market unrelated to their own performance,128 are defended by 
academics as an excellent method of reducing agency costs.129 
125 See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY 283, 297 (2005) (finding that the top five managers at 
substantial  (market capitalization over $50 million) public corporations were paid an 
average of 9.8% of earnings from 2001-2003). 
126 See Dorff, supra note 2, at 843-54. 
127 Id. at 854-55. 
128 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 139. 
129 See infra notes 183-189; see also Arthur H. Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1953). 
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Similarly, restricted stock, which BF argue share the same performance 
insensitivity as options,130 have been advocated by well-respected 
academics such as Charles Elson.131 Even now, BF’s contentions that 
these devices are inefficient remain hotly contested.132 
As a result of the difficulty of proving conclusively whether a 
compensation method is efficient or not, social cascades in the executive 
compensation area may turn out to be quite robust.  New information 
may call the conventional wisdom into question, but the resulting 
uncertainty may cause directors to be more reliant on other boards’ 
actions, not less.  Social cascades seem quite likely to form and endure in 
this environment. 
In addition, once a cascade has taken hold, the resulting decision 
may take on the legitimacy of the market.  Directors, executives and 
compensation consultants who wish to argue for alternative 
compensation structures will then have to overcome the powerful 
argument that the market has determined the traditional compensation 
forms are efficient.  Moreover, to compete for talented executives, 
corporations may have to offer the same inefficient (but management 
favoring) payment mechanisms offered by their peer companies.   
Recent events provided a dramatic illustration of this 
phenomenon.  When the bankruptcy court judge presiding over United 
Airlines’ Chapter 11 filing approved the executives’ new, very lucrative 
pay package, the court responded to objections that the executives’ pay 
was excessive by stating: 
 
It may be we have a culture in this country that 
overcompensates management, but United is just one 
enterprise that operates in that general environment . . . 
.The marketplace indicates this is a reasonable plan.133 
Whatever we may believe about managers’ influence over 
boards, that power is not very likely to extend to a federal bankruptcy 
judge.  Yet the presumably impartial and independent judge felt he had 
 
130 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 170-73. 
131 See Elson, supra note 66, at 944.  
132 See John Biggs, Executive Compensation: Perspectives From a Former CEO, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 755, 757 (2005) (arguing in favor of restricted stock). 
133 See Susan Carey, Judge Approves UAL’s Managers Incentive Plan, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, January 19, 2006, A2. 
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to bow to the market, even though he seemed to believe that the market 
was overcompensating executives.  The rhetorical legitimacy of the 
market can be incredibly difficult to overcome and may produce 
unusually stable social cascades. 
There are limits to the explanatory power of cascades, however.  
If a choice is obviously incorrect, participants with even minimal private 
information will know better than to select it.134 Compensation devices 
that are patently foolish, then, could not be chosen as the result of a 
social cascade.  Social cascades can plausibly explain only those pay 
structures that seem reasonable, at least on the surface, or which are so 
complex that directors are unlikely to invest the necessary effort or 
resources to comprehend their likely effects. 
Many common devices seem to fit this criterion, but not all.  
Bonuses, stock options, restricted stock, the freedom to unwind equity 
incentives, retirement pay and deferred compensation, company loans 
and soft landings for failures may all be the result of social cascades.  In 
contrast, cascades seem unlikely to be the cause of corporation’s award 
of what BF term “gratuitous payments,” (though these may be caused by 
groupthink).135 
In the following section, I will briefly explain why each of these 
compensation methods may appear reasonable, and why the arguments 
on either side seem difficult to resolve conclusively.  Groupthink boards 
– especially if led by self-consciously manipulative CEOs – may 
therefore easily fall prey to arguments in favor of such compensation 
devices.  Also, faced with great uncertainty, even well-functioning 
boards may rationally respond by following the lead of their peer 
corporations and ignoring whatever private misgivings they might have.  
The juxtaposition of this lack of private information with the ability to 
observe what similarly situated others have already chosen may produce 
a social cascade that results in boards adopting inefficient payment 
mechanisms.136 
134 A participant might select an option she or he knew to be incorrect in order to garner 
the praise of his or her peers (as with the teenager in the music store).  As explained 
above, I believe any social cascades in the executive compensation area are most likely 
to be caused (at least primarily) by information externalities, and not fear of social 
opprobrium. 
135 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 87. 
136 See supra notes 102, 111. 
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III.  Accounting for Inefficient Compensation Methods
Groups often make poor decisions, even when their members are 
individually sophisticated, intelligent, and well-educated.  Groupthink 
and social cascades provide an account of why certain types of groups – 
or groups facing certain circumstances – are particularly likely to make 
deficient choices.  I have argued in the previous section that public 
company boards crafting their CEOs’ compensation are likely to suffer 
from groupthink.  I have also argued that chief executive pay is an arena 
that may be experiencing a social cascade.  Either phenomenon or a 
combination of the two may explain why public company boards have 
adopted the inefficient payment devices BF have exposed.  Boards may 
be reaching poor conclusions because of well-recognized problems with 
group decision-making, rather than because of the CEOs’ power and the 
directors’ cupidity.  Directors may honestly (though erroneously) believe 
that they are adopting payment mechanisms that tie CEOs’ pay to their 
performance. 
 For either groupthink or a social cascade to produce an incorrect 
decision, the decision should not be obvious.  While groupthink is 
sufficiently powerful to occasionally generate even apparent errors, as 
Asch’s experiments famously demonstrated, inconspicuous errors are 
more likely to slip through.  It is easier to justify a choice that may be 
correct than one is that is clearly mistaken.  Social cascades acting alone 
should never produce results that are clearly wrong, since the basis of a 
cascade is a lack of information and not pressure to conform to a group 
decision.  Both phenomena should therefore prove most powerful when 
the decision at issue has no clear right or wrong answer. 
 Nearly all of the payment devices BF identify fall into this 
category.  BF argue powerfully that bonus plans, stock options, restricted 
stock, freedom to unwind equity incentives, retirement pay, company 
loans, and soft landings for failures are inefficient, at least in the forms in 
which boards have traditionally employed them.  (Gratuitous payments 
represent a special case, as I will explain below.)  But their arguments 
are subtle, complex, and – most importantly – hotly disputed by experts 
in the field.  The resulting confusion creates a situation ripe for 
groupthink or a social cascade to produce a suboptimal incentive 
structure for CEOs.  In this section, I will take the compensation 
mechanisms BF argue are inefficient one by one.  For each, I will briefly 
summarize BF’s exposure of the device’s weaknesses and then explain 
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why these weaknesses are far from obvious, so that boards’ use of the 
devices may be explained by Group Dynamics Theory. 
 Because groupthink and social cascades hinge on common 
factual support – the facial reasonableness of each compensation method 
– it may prove difficult to distinguish which phenomenon is operating.  
My point in this paper is not to isolate the particular cause of any given 
flaw in executive compensation.  I suspect that several dynamics – 
including managerial power – are operating simultaneously to produce 
the observed results.  For example, a board’s susceptibility to groupthink 
may increase when the CEO holds power over the directors.  Groups are 
more likely to succumb to groupthink when they have powerful and 
charismatic leaders, so we should expect a greater degree of groupthink 
among corporations whose CEOs play a larger role in choosing the 
corporation’s slate of directorial nominees.137 My goal here is to 
demonstrate that ample evidence exists to suggest that Group Dynamics 
Theory is, at the least, an important contributing factor to the problems 
we observe in the executive compensation system and may be the most 
important factor.  Any reform agenda must therefore include proposals 
that target group dynamics.138 
A.  Bonus Plans
1.  Managerial Power Theory
Bonus plans would appear to present an ideal compensation 
structure.  If executives know in advance they will receive extra 
compensation for achieving certain goals, they will likely work harder to 
achieve those goals.  This is precisely the purpose of compensation – to 
reduce agency costs by aligning workers’ motives with those of their 
employers.  To maximize their effectiveness, though, bonuses should be 
triggered by measures of individual performance, not the performance of 
 
137 See supra note 75. 
138 I will not attempt, in this short space, to present Optimal Contracting Theory’s 
defense of these features.  For those readers interested in such a defense, I highly 
recommend the excellent work of such scholars as Stephen Bainbridge, Jeffrey Gordon, 
Kevin Murphy and Randall Thomas. See supra note 14.  Throughout this Article, I 
assume that BF have correctly identified inefficiencies in executive compensation 
contracts.  Again, my purpose here is not to quarrel with BF’s evidence, or with the 
need for changes in the law, but rather to argue for an alternative explanation for the 
problems they have aptly identified and to propose a supplemental reform agenda. 
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the corporation as a whole.139 In addition, the performance measures 
should compare an executive’s achievements to those of his or her peers 
at competing companies.140 Otherwise, corporate officers may be 
rewarded for results they did not produce, that may be due to market-
wide effects rather than individual effort.141 
BF contend that boards have warped bonus structures to meet 
their own purposes.142 In order to please the senior managers who will 
determine if they retain their positions, directors have awarded bonuses 
based on objective targets that represent only mediocre performance 
(such as meeting a budget), or which have little to do with the 
executive’s own actions (such as increases in the firm’s stock price).143 
Directors have also made bonuses dependent on certain subjective 
criteria, such as effective leadership, which are easily manipulated by 
captive boards.144 Boards have even lowered bonus thresholds when it 
became clear that executives would not meet them.145 
These actions are difficult to explain if boards bargain at arms-
length with executives over their pay.  Independent boards should insist 
on conditioning bonuses on individual executive achievements, not luck.  
For example, an oil company executive should not be rewarded for an 
increase in the market price of oil that produces increased company 
profits.  No effort of the executive produced the shift in market prices, 
yet boards’ bonus plans frequently reward increases in company profits 
that result from external effects like this one.146 
139 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 121-36 (discussing non-equity-based 
compensation). 
140 Id. at 122 (noting that empirical work has failed to find a strong correlation between 
cash compensation and managers’ performance relative to their respective industries). 
141 Id. at 123 (citing a study showing that managers were paid the same for a “lucky” 
dollar (as in increase in oil prices) as for a “general” dollar (a dollar that was not 
generated by such luck)); See also Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Are 
CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. OF ECON. 901, 
901-32 (2001). 
142 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 121-36 (discussing bonus structures and 
criteria).  
143 Id. at 122-27 (noting that CEO cash compensation is strongly correlated with 
market-wide stock price increases). 
144 Id. at 126.  
145 Id. at 127 (citing Richard Trigauz, Great Disconnect, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 
26, 2002, at 1H; Louis Lavelle, Executive Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 15, 2002, at 84; David 
Leonhardt, Coke Rewrote Rules, Aiding Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at sec. 3, 6.).  
146 See supra note 141. 
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BF argue that observed bonus plans are better explained by their 
Managerial Power theory.147 Boards use bonus plans as useful 
camouflage to disguise funneling excessive compensation to chief 
executives.148 If pressed, directors can assert that the compensation was 
earned by the executive’s superior performance, even though in fact the 
bonus was triggered by goals that may have had little, if anything, to do 
with the executive’s own actions.149 
2.  Group Dynamics Theory
Although BF make a powerful case that public company boards 
currently use bonuses poorly, there are also strong arguments that the 
traditional forms of bonuses are efficient.  Bonuses are not only common 
for non-executive employees, but they appear on their face to be strongly 
related to individual performance.  Tying bonuses to the company’s 
stock price, the measure of corporate performance most important to 
shareholders, might be an efficient method of motivating the CEO to 
focus on what should be his or her most important goal.  Choosing 
narrower goals, such as performance within budget or successful 
leadership, appears to be a reasonable attempt to address one of BF’s 
core concerns, the disconnect between CEOs’ individual performance 
and their compensation.150 
Although effective leadership is a subjective criterion, board 
members – especially those who are themselves chief executives of large 
corporations – are likely to believe themselves capable of accurate 
judgment.  Because of the egocentric bias, they may actually have 
greater faith in their own ability to evaluate the CEO’s success than they 
do in objective measures such as earnings per share or stock price.151 As 
BF point out, these objective goals may be met despite inadequate 
 
147 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 121-22. 
148 Id. at 67-68. 
149 Id., at 135-36 
150 Id. at 126. 
151The egocentric bias refers to people’s tendency, “to view available evidence as being 
more supportive of their beliefs and positions than is objectively appropriate, to 
overestimate their own skills and abilities, and to be unrealistically optimistic about 
future life events.”  Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 12 (2002). 
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leadership, or missed despite outstanding performance.152 Subjective 
criteria permit board members to account for all the difficulties the CEO 
did (or did not) overcome. 
In sum, bonuses appear reasonable on their face, and the 
arguments that they are inefficient are complex and difficult to resolve 
conclusively.  As a result, boards may resolve the associated difficulties 
by deferring to the CEO, producing groupthink.  Alternatively, the board 
may turn to peer corporations and mimic their behavior, resulting in a 
social cascade.  In either event, the directors may choose a bonus plan 
that is less than ideal as a result of a flaw in their decision-making 
process. 
 
B.  Structure of Options
1.  Managerial Power Theory
BF attack stock options as yet another method of disguising 
excessive pay as performance-based.153 In the past ten years, stock 
options have arguably become the single most important form of 
executive compensation, accounting for a larger percentage of total 
compensation than even salaries or bonuses.154 Many scholars have 
applauded the rise of options, arguing that equity ownership is the best 
method to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders.155 
Although BF acknowledge options provide some positive incentive 
effects,156 they contend that too many stock options are granted, 
rewarding CEOs more than necessary to purchase their services.157 
More importantly from an incentives perspective, options are designed 
poorly if their purpose is to reward managers for their efforts in 
 
152 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 124-27. 
153 Id. at 137-85. 
154 For S&P 500 firms, the salary portion of CEO compensation declined from 36% to 
21% of total compensation from 1992-98.  The option-based portion of CEO 
compensation increased from 22% to 38% from 1992-98 in S&P 500 firms.  See Perry 
& Zenner, supra note 2, at 131.  See also Barris, supra note 2, at 64 (stating that options 
increased as a percentage of total compensation from 8% in 1985 to 31% in 1991). 
155 See infra notes 183-189. 
156 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 137 (supporting general idea of equity-based 
compensation). 
157 Id. at 138. 
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improving corporate performance.158 Stock options are a blunt 
instrument; they enrich managers for their successful efforts, but they 
also reward employees for growth in the industry generally, 
improvements in the economy, changes in interest rates, and other 
external causes of growth.159 Relatively simple changes in option design 
could eliminate many, though perhaps not all, of these windfall 
profits.160 For example, the options’ exercise price could be determined 
by reference to an industry or market index.161 The exercise price would 
then increase when the index increased, so that the options would only 
become valuable if the corporation performed better than the average 
large corporation (if indexed to the market as a whole) or better than its 
average competitor (if indexed to an industry index).162 Despite the 
simplicity and apparent efficiency of utilizing such indexed options, 
however, few options are indexed.163 
Three other common board behaviors in managing options seem 
better explained by boards’ capture than by their efficiency.  First, 
boards nearly universally set the options’ exercise price at the market 
price the day the options are granted.164 BF question why that precise 
price should always generate the most optimal incentives.165 While 
setting the strike price below the market price (“in the money” options) 
would have adverse tax consequences,166 there is no similarly obvious 
explanation for most corporations’ failure to set the exercise price above 
market (“out of the money”).167 
158 Id.
159 Id. at 139; see also Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation 
Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901-40 (2001) (discussing stock options in general). 
160 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 140-43 (arguing companies could at least 
filter out changes due to sector or general stock market trends by measuring the 
company’s performance relative to easily calculated benchmarks). 
161 Id. at 141-42. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 143 (noting that in 2002, only 8.5% of large public firms issuing options to 
executives conditioned even a portion of the grant on performance). 
164 Id. at 159-62 (stating that strike price is set at stock price on date of the grant 95% of 
the time). 
165 Id. at 162. 
166.Id. at 160 (noting that in-the-money options are not deductible because they are not 
performance-based compensation). See also Anabtawi, supra note 42, at 1571 
(discussing option repricing). 
167 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 160-61 (contending that out-of-the-money 
options often generate much higher pay-for-performance sensitivity per dollar of 
expected value than conventional options); but see Anabtawi, supra note 170, at 1571-
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Second, boards frequently lower the exercise price of previously 
issued options when the stock market as a whole declines, either directly 
or by issuing replacement options with a lower strike price.168 Although 
repricing options is sometimes justified as necessary to preserve 
executives’ incentives, or to prevent them from leaving the firm, BF 
argue that indexed options would achieve the same goals.169 Companies’ 
willingness to reduce options’ exercise price when the stock market as a 
whole declines, and not increase exercise price when it rises, seems to 
support the Managerial Power hypothesis.170 
Third, when executives exercise their stock options, many 
corporations automatically “reload” the options, granting the managers 
new options with an exercise price set at the market price on the grant 
date.171 Reload options are very valuable, because they enable 
employees to profit from an increase in the company’s stock price 
without giving up the potential to earn even more money if the stock 
continues to rise.172 Like repricing, reload options are sometimes 
justified by citing the need to preserve executives’ incentive.173 Once 
executives have exercised their options and sold the resulting stock, the 
options lose their incentive effect; managers without a significant equity 
stake in the company are more likely to have interests that diverge from 
shareholders’.  BF counter that it would be easier to achieve this goal by 
restricting executives’ ability to sell their company stock.174 Instead, 
reload options permit senior managers to profit from stock price 
volatility and to receive additional compensation that is not related to 
their performance.175 In short, reload options do a poor job of motivating 
performance.  Their popularity among boards despite their flaws may 
suggest some improper directorial motive.176 
74 (arguing that option price too far out-of-the-money option are ineffective). See also 
infra notes 190–191 and associated text. 
168 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 164-67 (arguing that this further reduces the 
link between pay and performance). 
169 Id. at 166. 
170 Id. at 164-68 (citing Menachem Brenner, Rangarajan K. Sundaram, and David 
Yermack, Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 110 
(2000)). 




175 Id. at 170. 
176 Id. 
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2.  Group Dynamics Theory
Although BF again make some very strong arguments that 
conventional options could be much better designed to motivate CEOs, 
other experts disagree.  Stock options still inspire passionate defenders 
today.177 Their essential justification is that executives should be 
induced to care about what matters most to shareholders – stock price.178 
Options appear to achieve this end by rewarding executives exactly in 
proportion to the increase in the company’s share price.  Most 
corporations set their options’ exercise price at the market price as of the 
date the options are granted.179 If the stock price then rises, option-
holders share shareholders’ resulting profits; the more the stock price 
increases, the more option-holders profit.180 The basic idea behind 
options, then, seems perfectly reasonable. 
As BF point out, though, some common features of options 
require further explication.  The failure to index options might be 
explained by groupthink or cascades.  Not only do ordinary (non-
indexed) options have obvious intuitive appeal, but as BF acknowledge, 
many scholars have argued that ordinary options are more efficient than 
indexed options.181 For example, commentators have argued that 
indexed options would create distortions in the employment market, by 
 
177 See infra notes 183-185. 
178 See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficency: An Introduction to the 
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (discussing the recent enthusiasm for 
"incentivizing" corporate officers with options); Matthew A. Melone, Are 
Compensatory Stock Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 535, 537 
(2002/2003) (discussing stock options as incentive compensation). 
179 See supra note 1644. 
180 Id. 
181 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 147-58 (discussing commentators); see also 
Levmore, supra note 159, at 1922-24; Charles P. Himmelberg and R. Glenn Hubbard, 
Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An analysis of Pay-for-Performance
Sensitivity at 2 (June 2000), available at
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard/Papers/ceo10.pdf; Li Jin, CEO 
Compensation, Diversification and Incentives at 25, working paper (2000), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=254260; Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: 
Managerial Power Versus The Perceived Cost Of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
847, 863 (2002); David M. Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV., 1941, 1942-43 (2001). 
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providing executives with an incentive to less competitive sectors.182 
Other academics have contended that indexed options would induce 
CEOs to take excessive risks in an effort to race ahead of their 
competitors;183 that conventional options help retain managers by 
automatically increasing their pay during periods of economic 
prosperity, when the competition for executives may be at its most 
fierce;184 that indexed options would impose too much risk on 
executives;185 that non-indexed options are equivalent to providing 
executives with a degree of desirable diversification through implicit 
investment in the broader market;186 and that ordinary options may 
provide a method of avoiding the $1 million deductibility cap on 
compensation that is not performance related.187 
182 See Surya N. Janakiraman, et. al, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative 
Performance Evlauaiton Hypothesis, 30 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 53, 67 (1992); 
Ronald A. Dye, Relative Performance Evaluation and Project Selection, 30 J. 
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 27, 28 (1992).  
183 See Levmore, supra note 159, at 1922-24. 
184 See Himmelberg and Hubbard, supra note 181, at 2 (arguing that conventional 
options help retain talented managers during market booms; the better the market does, 
the higher the demand for executives, and the more companies must pay CEOs to retain 
them; conventional options do this automatically by going up when market increases); 
see also Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have No Incentive Effects? at 1-
2, Stanford University Graduate School of Business working paper (2000), available at 
http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/oyer/wp/luck.pdf (presenting a model in which it is 
optimal to pay individuals for group-level, industry-level, or economy-wide 
performance because agents' opportunities are correlated with aggregate performance 
and it is costly to adjust terms of employment contracts).  
185 See Murphy, supra note 181, at 862-63 (arguing that indexed options would impose 
too much additional risk of nonpayment on risk-averse executives; reporting that the 
probability that a given stock will earn returns in excess of a value-weighted index is 
below 50%, while there is an 80% chance that by the time a ten-year conventional 
option expires, the stock price will exceed the exercise price). 
186 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 137-38; see also Jin, supra note 181, at 25 
(observing that indexing shifts market risk back to shareholders who might also be risk 
averse, and thus that from a pure risk-sharing perspective the optimal contract might not 
involve indexing).
187 26 USC § 162m (1994). See Schizer, supra note 181, at 1942-43 (noting that 
conventional options have a potential tax advantage over indexed because they give 
managers nonperformance value that the company can still deduct even if over $1 
million in pay; observing too, however, that firms have largely avoided indexed options 
even when there was no tax advantage to delivering performance-decoupled pay 
through conventional options, as was the case before 1994 when there was no limit on 
pay deductibility). 
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 BF have eloquent and thoughtful responses to these arguments 
and others.  But even impartial scholars in the field find these issues 
muddy.  Directors – whose primary expertise almost always lies in areas 
other than executive compensation – cannot be expected to feel certain 
that indexed options are clearly superior to the conventional variety.  As 
a result, even a fairly intense investigation of the topic might ultimately 
be resolved by the response – especially if uttered by a trusted expert 
such as a compensation consultant – that “everyone else is doing it,” 
producing a social cascade.  Also, the question is sufficiently close that a 
board suffering from groupthink should have no trouble agreeing with a 
CEO who argues that conventional options are superior. 
Boards’ tendency to set strike prices at market may similarly be 
explained by groupthink or social cascades.188 BF correctly point out 
that the optimal strike price should vary based on the particular 
circumstances of the company and its executives.189 A small, rapidly 
growing company, for example, whose stock is already expected to 
increase quickly, might want to set exercise prices considerably above 
market, to reward executives only for performance that is greater than 
predicted.  Setting a higher exercise price, though, risks eliminating the 
incentive altogether.190 If the strike price seems unreachable, executives 
may not try at all, defeating the whole purpose of granting options.191 In 
addition, in competing for employees with companies that offer at-the-
market options, a company that wishes to set strike prices significantly 
above market will have to offer potential employees many more options 
to make up for the increased risk that the options will prove worthless.192 
188 See supra note 164 (discussing boards’ tendency to set strike price at market).  
189 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 159-62. 
190 See Anabtawi, supra note 42, at 1571 (“An executive whose options are severely 
underwater may believe that no amount of effort will bring the options back into the 
money, effectively severing the link between pay and performance as to those 
options.”) 
191 Id. This argument does not explain, however, why so few companies set strike prices 
even a little above the market price.  See also Levmore, supra note 159, at 1924 
(discussing diminished incentive function of options priced well out-of-the-money). 
192 See Edmond T. FitzGerald, Public Company CEO Compensation: A Review Of The 
Recent Reforms, 1433 PLI/Corp 441, 463 (2004); Levmore, supra note 159, at 1924 
(discussing the necessity of raising pay or granting more options to compensate for 
increased risk imposed by them); see also Patrick Bolton, Jose Scheinkman, and Wei 
Xiong, Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative 
Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 739-40 (2005) (citing Abel Cadenillas et al., Leverage 
Decision and Manager Compensation with Choices of Effort and Volatility, 73 J. FIN.
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Shareholders of such a company face the potential for significantly 
greater dilution of their stock.193 The choice between the incentive 
benefits of an above-market exercise price and the associated dilution 
risks is far from obvious.  Faced with such a difficult and complex 
decision, boards are quite likely to mimic what their peers have done, 
generating a social cascade. 
There are also reasonable justifications for lowering options’ 
strike price when the market as a whole declines.194 As Iman Anabtawi 
has explained, when market prices decline too far below the exercise 
price, the options lose their power to motivate and retain executives.195 
Executives whose options are too far “underwater” may simply write 
them off as worthless.  Valuable options may help to retain employees 
by imposing a large exit cost; employees who leave before their options 
vest forfeit them.196 Options that are deeply underwater, however, lose 
their deterrent value.197 Repricing options may be justified, then, as 
necessary to retain executives and preserve their incentive to raise the 
company’s stock price.  Again, I am not suggesting that repricing is 
always or even usually the best strategy for boards to take, only that the 
correct decision is sufficiently unclear to create an environment 
amenable to groupthink or a social cascade.198 
ECON. 71, 84-87 (2003) and Brian Hall & Kevin Murphy, Stock Options for 
Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON., 3, 33-35 (2002) demonstrating that it is 
difficult to calculate how much more incentive is provided by out-of-the-money 
options), therefore it may not be worth the added expense of granting more options to 
compensate for increased risk). 
193 See FitzGerald , supra note 192, at 463.  See also Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. 
Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 31, 59-60 (2000) (discussing potential dilutive effect of stock options 
on existing shareholders). 
194 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 166. 
195 See Anabtawi, supra note 42, at 1571; see also Viral V. Acharya et al., On the 
Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 66-67 (2000) 
196 See Anabtawi, supra note 42, at 1572. 
197 Id. at 1571. 
198 Anabatawi also points out that boards reprice executives’ options in response to 
firm-specific problems more often than in reaction to industry-wide or market-wide 
events, citing Li Jin & Lisa Meulbroek, Do Underwater Executive Stock Options Still 
Align Incentives?: The Effect of Stock Price Movements on Managerial-Incentive 
Alignment, 9-10 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 02-002, 2001). Anabatawi, supra 
note 42, at 1573. Jin and Meulbroek in turn cite for this finding to a study by Carter and 
Lynch, M.E. Carter and L. J. Lynch, An Examination of Executive Stock Option 
Repricing, 61 J FIN ECON 207, 207-225 (2001). Anabtawi argues that this study 
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The final troubling aspect of options – reload features – may also 
be produced by groupthink or by social cascades.  Reload options are 
clearly highly desirable for employees, since they permit option holders 
to lock in current gains while still preserving the possibility of further 
advances.199 At the same time, as Kevin Murphy has argued, boards 
may perceive reload options as a low-cost method of compensating 
executives, since they cost the company no cash and do not require an 
accounting charge.200 Since reload options appear to provide a low-cost 
method of providing high-value compensation, boards may believe they 
are desirable, despite their high actual costs.201 In addition, champions 
of reload options have argued that they promote employee stock 
ownership, by encouraging executives to exercise their options earlier.202 
Faced with complicated and conflicting evidence as to the efficiency of 
reload options, boards might well choose to follow their CEO’s lead (in a 
groupthink board) or to imitate their peers (producing a social cascade). 
 
C.  Restricted Stock
1.  Managerial Power Theory
After discussing the problems with options, some commentators, 
most notably Charles Elson, have advocated substituting restricted 
stock.203 Elson argues that grants of restricted stock align managers’ 
 
supports the managerial power explanation of repricing.  Jin and Meulbroek 
themselves, however, argue that the explanation lies in people’s inability to distinguish 
between individual talent and environmental factors in determining the cause of 
success.  This explanation is entirely consistent with the social cascade explanation.  
Directors who possess little information as to the cause of a stock price decline, and 
who are faced with conflicting research as the merits of repricing (such as that 
discussed by Jin and Meulbroek at pp. 10-11), might well choose to follow the lead of 
other companies in choosing to reprice stock options. 
199 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 137-85; Murphy, supra note 181, at 866. 
200 See Murphy, supra note 181, at 866. 
201 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 169-70 (discussing reload option); see also 
Murphy, supra note 181, at 866 (stating that the economic cost to companies granting 
options with reload provisions is high). 
202 See Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, & David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, n. 204 
(2002) (citing proponents). 
203 See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 
U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 690-92 (1995) [hereinafter "Elson I"] (suggesting that directors 
should be paid in restricted stock); see also Elson, supra note 66, at 981-83; Charles M. 
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incentives with those of shareholders, with fewer attendant problems. 204 
Unlike options, restricted stock generally cannot be sold until the 
executive leaves the company.  Executives paid in restricted stock 
therefore would not have an incentive to artificially inflate the share 
price over the short term, since they would not be able to cash in their 
stock until some time after they leave the company.205 
BF respond that restricted stock suffers from the same windfall 
problems posed by stock options.  Like stock options, restricted stock’s 
value may rise because of causes entirely apart from the senior 
managers’ efforts.206 Worse, restricted stock is like an option with an 
exercise price of zero.207 Restricted shares therefore increase the 
windfall problem posed by stock options.208 
Some corporations have begun issuing restricted stock, however, 
in response to the increasing criticism of stock options.209 Although BF 
concede that restricted stock may possess one advantage over options – 
executives’ inability to sell their restricted shares and thereby eliminate 
the incentive to increase the stock price – they point out that options 
could also be so restricted.210 Indexed options with such restrictions on 
sale would possess all the benefits of restricted stock without the 
associated windfalls.  Boards’ nevertheless prefer to award restricted 
stock, indicating that some motive – such as capture – other than 
efficient compensation drives their decision.211 
Elson, Director Compensation And The Management-Captured Board - The History Of 
A Symptom and a Cure, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 164-73 (1996) [hereinafter "Elson II"]; 
Murphy, supra note 110, at 738 ("[Restricted stock] continues to be one of the most 
effective vehicles for providing both incentives and compensation to managers."). 
204 See supra note 203. 
205 See Elson II, supra note 203, at 130-31; Elson I, supra note 203, at 985 (“To prevent 
the quick liquidation of these stock payments and consequent loss of equity-based 
incentive, the stock awarded must be restricted as to resale during the individual’s 
directorship.”). 
206 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 170-73 (discussing restricted stock). 
207 Id. at 171. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. See also Joann S. Lublin, With Options Tainted, Companies Award Restricted 
Stock, WALL ST. J., March 3, 2003, at B1. 
210 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 172. 
211 Id. at 173. 
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2.  Group Dynamics Theory
Restricted stock has a certain wholesome, emotional appeal.212 
In contrast to options, which are relatively complicated and have recently 
become controversial, restricted stock seems soothingly simple.  If 
boards want executives to share stockholders’ incentives, the most 
straightforward thing to do is simply to make them stockholders.  
Restricting the stock’s resale to ensure the executives remain 
shareholders is universally acknowledged as a positive aspect of this 
compensation method.213 
Restricted stock may also allow directors to make positive use of 
the endowment effect.214 In contrast to options, which represent only 
contingent ownership, restricted stock awards grant executives 
immediate ownership of an equity interest in the firm.  Executives may 
therefore experience a subsequent decline in stock price as a more 
tangible loss of wealth they actually owned, rather than merely the loss 
of the potential wealth generated by options.215 
The appeal of restricted stock has long prompted scholars such as 
Charles Elson to advocate the use of restricted stock in compensation 
packages, at least for independent directors.216 A thorough analysis of 
the device might result, as BF contend, in a conclusion that restricted 
stock is inefficient and results in compensation that is poorly correlated 
to executives’ performance.  Nevertheless, the intuitive appeal of 
restricted stock, combined with significant support from scholars and 
other experts, may have sufficiently confused the issue to persuade a 
groupthink board of restricted stock’s merits or to induce an uncertain 
board to turn to other corporations for guidance, resulting in a social 
cascade. 
 
212 Id. at 171. 
213 Even BF seem to believe that the restriction on resale is a positive feature.  See id. at 
173. 
214 According to renowned expert Russell Korobkin, the endowment effect “stands for 
the principal that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they 
do not.”  Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect And Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1228 (2003). 
215 Id. at 1250-55 (explaining that the endowment effect is generally attributed to loss 
aversion, the notion that losses are perceived to be more serious than equivalent gains). 
216 See Elson, supra note 66, at 981-83 (advocating compensating outside directors with 
restricted stock); Elson, supra note 203, at 690-93 (same). 
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D.  Freedom to Unwind Equity Incentives  
1.  Managerial Power Theory
Corporations rarely impose limits on executives’ ability to 
unwind the incentives produced by stock options.217 Senior managers 
generally remain free to exercise vested options and sell the resulting 
shares whenever the price seems advantageous.218 Not surprisingly, 
then, recipients exercise their options after an average of less than six 
years, and then sell roughly 90% of the shares gained.219 In addition, 
executives are almost always free effectively to cash in their options 
even before exercising them, by trading in derivatives.220 By using 
collars,221 for example, option-holders may essentially eliminate both the 
risk of the stock price sinking and the gain from any future rise, while 
simultaneously profiting from the difference between the options’ 
exercise price and the current market price.222 The incentives created by 
stock options may therefore be even shorter-lived than first appears. 
BF argue that boards’ failure to restrict CEOs from undercutting 
the incentives options are designed to produce further supports their 
thesis that boards are captured.223 Directors who desired efficient 
compensation would be unlikely to spend enormous sums of the 
corporation’s money to align executives’ incentives with those of 
shareholders without ensuring that those incentives were reasonably 
durable.224 A captured board, however, might well justify large equity 
grants to the CEO and other senior officers by claiming that equity 
ownership would produce desirable incentives, without providing the 
necessary restrictions to preserve those incentives.225 Using unrestricted 
 
217 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 174.   
218 Id. at 179. 
219 Id. at 176; Jennifer Carpenter, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock 
Options, 48 J. OF FIN. ECON.. 127, 139 (1998). 
220 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 176-77. 
221 A collar consists of buying a put option at the same time as selling a call option 
while owning a particular asset.  See JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER 
DERIVATIVES (6th ed. 2005). 
222 Id. 
223 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 185. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
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equity instead of cash provides the board with “camouflage” without 
imposing unacceptable risks of loss to senior management.226 
2.  Group Dynamics Theory
As BF acknowledge, restricting executives’ ability to unwind the 
equity incentives provided by options and restricted stock would impose 
liquidity and diversification costs.227 Corporate officers subject to such 
restrictions would be unable to realize the value of their equity assets for 
long periods of time.  If they discovered a better investment opportunity 
or needed money to spend on consumption, their options and restricted 
stock would be unavailable.  Rational executives would therefore 
demand higher pay in compensation for the liquidity costs associated 
with limits on their ability to unwind equity incentives. 
Also, restrictions would impede employees’ efforts to diversify 
their investments, subjecting them to significant risks of financial 
losses.228 Executives whose portfolios consisted primarily or exclusively 
of equity in their employing corporation would likely prove risk averse 
in determining corporate actions.  Finance theorists argue that diversified 
shareholders prefer corporations to pursue investments with the highest 
expected return, even if those opportunities are risky.229 But 
undiversified executives would generally have sharply different risk 
preferences.  Equity restrictions might therefore actually increase agency 
costs. 
The analysis of whether equity restrictions ultimately would 
increase or reduce total agency costs is complex and uncertain.  I tend to 
agree with BF that restrictions on executives’ ability to unwind equity 
incentives should prove efficient under at least some circumstances.230 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 176; see also Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like 
Bureaucrats?, (March 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2086 (“The data 
suggest that it could be very costly to firms to force CEOs to put a large fraction of their 
wealth at risk, since the firm would have to compensate the CEOs for taking such a 
risk.”) 
228 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 176. 
229 See Hall and Liebman, supra note 227, at 11 (arguing that equity restrictions “may 
induce risk-averse CEOs to avoid high-risk, high-return projects that are optimal from 
the perspective of well-diversified shareholders.”)  
230 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 178. 
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But the issue is quite murky in most cases, creating a ripe situation for 
groupthink or a social cascade.231 
E.  Retirement Pay
1.  Managerial Power Theory
Since the corporation bargains at arms-length with employees 
below the level of the senior management team, the arrangements made 
with these workers should be efficient.  BF point out that corporations 
provide pension plans for lower-level employees only to the extent that 
the government subsidizes the plans with tax benefits.232 The plans set 
up for CEOs, in contrast, generally do not qualify for such favored tax 
treatment.  Qualifying plans provide a deduction to the corporation but 
do not count as taxable income to the employee until the employee takes 
the money out of the plan.233 But these plans can only be based on 
compensation that does not exceed about $200,000.234 Because the 
retirement plans provided to CEOs (Supplemental Executive Retirement 
Plans (“SERPs”)) are generally based on income that far exceeds this 
amount, corporations which grant them do not receive a deduction for 
the amount paid into the plan on the CEO’s behalf, and also pay taxes on 
the investment income generated by the retirement funds.235 
In addition, SERPs differ from the benefits provided to most 
other employees in that they are defined benefit – not defined 
contribution – plans.236 This change brings two consequences.  First, the 
corporation bears the investment risk.  Regardless of whether the funds 
set aside by the corporation are invested well or poorly, the corporation 
is obligated to provide a set benefit to the senior executive.237 Second, 
the investment income earned on the money provided is largely invisible 
 
231 See supra notes 102, 111 (discussing necessary conditions for a social cascade).  I 
should note that BF’s claim that executives exercise their freedom to unwind their 
equity incentives is strongly disputed.  See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, and Randall 
S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 
MICHIGAN L. REV. 1142, 1179-81 (2005). 
232 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 95. 
233 Id. at 96-97. 
234 Id.  
235 Id. at 97-98.  
236 Id. at 98-99. 
237 Id. .
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to shareholders.238 Under the current rules, corporations need not 
disclose on the executive income tables the increase in present value of 
the CEO’s pension plan due to increasing years of service and/or 
increasing salary.239 
BF thus argue quite strongly that the pension plans provided to 
CEOs and other senior executives are not efficient.  These benefits differ 
sharply in several important respects from the analogous benefits 
provided to lower-level employees, are not linked to the performance of 
the executives who receive them, and are relatively difficult for 
shareholders or the financial press to evaluate in detail.240 Their wide-
spread use by public corporations (70% in 2002241) despite these 
problems supports BF’s theory that boards’ primary goal in negotiating 
the CEO’s compensation package is not efficiency, but maintaining the 
CEO’s good will.242 
In addition to SERPS, corporations also often offer senior 
executives the opportunity to defer some portion of their 
compensation.243 This arrangement is highly beneficial to the 
participating executives, because they do not pay taxes on deferred 
income until they actually receive it.244 In addition, while the 
corporation retains the money, the executives receive interest income – 
often above market rates – which is also tax-free until actually paid 
 
238 See Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003) (“Among the arrangements used by firms that 
camouflage the amount and the performance-insensitivity of compensation are pension 
plans, deferred compensation, and post-retirement perks and consulting contracts.”); see 
also, Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation, at 23-24 (June 1999), in ORLEY 
ASHENFELTER AND DAVID CARD (EDS.), HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, Vol. 3, 
North Holland (1999), available at http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~kjmurphy/ceopay.pdf 
(explaining why some have called SERPs “the ultimate form of ‘stealth 
compensation.’”). 
239 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 99-100.  The SEC’s Proposed Rule 
2.B.1.d.ii regarding disclosure of executive compensation, if passed, may effectively 
change this result by requiring disclosure of the amount each covered officer would 
likely receive in annual retirement benefits once that officer became eligible for 
retirement.  See 71 FED. REG. 6542, 6561 (2006), also available at 
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-8655fr.pdf.  
240 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 96-99. 
241 Id. at 98. 
242 Id. at 95-102. 
243 Id. at 102-03. 
244 Id. at 102. 
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out.245 If instead the executives had taken their full salaries and invested 
their earnings themselves, they would (a) pay income taxes on the salary 
earned, and therefore invest a smaller amount, and (b) pay income taxes 
on the investment income earned on the money.246 Deferred 
compensation plans are therefore enormously beneficial to executives 
permitted to participate. 
From the corporation’s perspective, these arrangements have a 
very different complexion.  By deferring some of an executive’s salary, 
the corporation loses the tax deduction that it would have accrued.247 
The corporation also pays taxes on the income it earns by investing the 
money on the executive’s behalf.248 The corporation does not receive a 
tax deduction until it actually pays the executive, generally many years 
later.249 
These arrangements might be efficient if a corporation either paid 
taxes at a lower rate than an individual executive, or had access to above-
market returns on investment.250 BF correctly point out, however, that 
corporations generally pay much higher taxes than individuals on long-
term capital gains.251 Also, corporations with ready access to capital 
through the financial markets are unlikely to have above-market returns 
to offer to executive “lenders.”252 If they did, they would borrow money 
from the markets at the market rate and invest it at above-market rates.  
There would be no need to pay executives abnormally high returns to 
garner this opportunity. 
Additional, though indirect, evidence of this arrangement’s 
inefficiency comes from an examination of the benefits offered to lower-
level employees.  These workers are not generally provided an 
opportunity to defer compensation, unless the deferral is tax efficient, 
such as through the use of a 401(k) plan.253 Once the comparatively low 
limits imposed on such plans are exceeded, corporations seldom offer 
 
245 Id. at 102-03. 







253 Id. at 103. 
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employees the type of deferred compensation benefit frequently offered 
to senior executives.254 
If deferred compensation arrangements are inefficient, why do 
profit-driven corporations use them?  BF cogently argue that these plans 
offer captive boards an opportunity to divert extra income to senior 
executives without bearing outrage costs.255 Deferred compensation 
plans are easily camouflaged.  Although the amount deferred must be 
disclosed in the SEC compensation tables, the investment return 
corporations pay executives on this amount does not, unless it exceeds 
120% of the federal rate at the time the corporation establishes the rate of 
return.256 This rule allows corporations to increase the guaranteed rate of 
return when interests rates rise without disclosure.257 At the same time, 
firms may freely maintain previous high rates of return without 
disclosure when the market rate declines.258 
2.  Group Dynamics Theory
Retirement pay and deferred compensation can be justified as the 
low-risk component of executive compensation.  Although BF argue that 
pay should be closely tied to performance to maximize executives’ 
incentives to excel, not all pay can be performance-related.259 Even in 
undisputedly arms-length employment relationships, much of 
employees’ pay comes in risk-free forms such as guaranteed salary and 
retirement benefits.  These compensation forms are uncontroversial 
when used to reward employees who are lower in the pecking order and 
therefore impose lower agency costs.  Performance pay is arguably more 
important, however, for corporate officers less subject to supervision, 
such as CEOs.  Even for these officers, though, some portion of 
guaranteed pay is likely to prove efficient.  Most people are risk-averse 
in regard to loss, at least to some degree, and corporate officers are no 
 
254 Id. at.105. 
255 Id. at 105-07. 
256 Id. at 106. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 19 (“Economists have long believed that efficient compensation contracts 
should link pay with performance to provide executives with desirable incentives.”) 
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exception.260 CEOs asked to forego any form of guaranteed pay are 
therefore likely to insist on much higher expected compensation to offset 
the risk of receiving nothing at all.  Some blend of guaranteed and 
performance-linked pay is likely the most efficient outcome in most 
cases. 
Although these forms of compensation may be acceptable, BF 
appear to argue that the amounts that are awarded through these methods 
are not.  When corporations award lower-level employees retirement pay 
or deferred compensation, they provide only as much as receives a tax 
subsidy.261 Executives, in contrast, receive much more.  BF argue – 
perhaps correctly – that this dichotomy demonstrates that retirement pay 
and deferred compensation are not efficient, presumably because 
employees value other forms of guaranteed pay (such as salaries) more 
than retirement benefits. 
But again, the issues involved are complex and not easy to 
resolve conclusively.  Even BF do not advance direct evidence that 
retirement pay is inefficient for all CEOs. Executives, much of whose 
pay is dependent on the corporation’s performance and/or its stock price, 
may value retirement pay’s security more than lower-level employees, 
most of whose compensation comes in a guaranteed salary.  The analysis 
is sufficiently complex that a strong CEO may persuade a consensus-
driven board to adopt a favorable retirement package. Alternatively, in 
the presence of this uncertainty, a social cascade may arise in which 
boards follow the first few movers and disregard their own private 
information. 
 
F.  Company Loans
1.  Managerial Power Theory
BF remind us that prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, public corporations 
frequently loaned large sums of money to their officers and directors at 
below-market interest rates.262 These loans were generally either 
unsecured or secured only by corporate stock, and firms often committed 
 
260 See Cass Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN.. L. REV. 1556, 
1591 (2004) (“[P]eople are risk-averse with respect to gains, but risk-seeking with 
respect to losses . . . .”). 
261 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 95. 
262 Id. at 112. 
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to forgiving the loans entirely if the recipient remained at the company 
for a set number of years.263 
A corporation could set up a system of loans that would 
encourage performance.  For example, a company might agree to forgive 
portions of the loan as the executive achieved certain performance 
targets.  Alternatively, the firm might loan an executive money for the 
sole purpose of purchasing corporate stock, thereby better aligning the 
executive’s interests with those of shareholders.  The loans actually 
made, however, did not include such features.  Loan forgiveness was 
tied, not to performance, but to tenure, rewarding executives simply for 
staying regardless of what they achieved.264 And although 40% of 
corporate loans made in 2002 helped executives buy company stock, the 
lending firms did not restrict executives’ ability to sell shares they 
already owned at the same time they were purchasing new shares with 
the loaned funds.265 As a result, the recipients of such loans on net used 
an average of only 8% of the money loaned to increase their share 
ownership.266 
According to BF, boards utilized corporate loans as a means of 
enriching executives while avoiding outrage costs.267 Although when 
loans were permitted, the SEC required disclosure of the interest rate 
subsidy (the extent to which the market rate exceeded the loan’s rate), 
BF argue that the definition of this term was ambiguous, permitting 
many corporations to avoid this disclosure requirement.268 In addition, 
BF point out, the amount loaned did not count as compensation unless 
and until the debt was forgiven.269 As such, companies could delay the 
disclosure of this form of compensation for many years.270 Corporate 
loans therefore provide additional, though historic, evidence that boards 
grant senior executives performance insensitive compensation in ways 
that are difficult for investors to detect.271 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 112-14. 
265 Id. at 114. 
266 Id. at 114-15. 
267 Id. at 115-17. 
268 Id. at 115. 
269 Id. at 116. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 112-17. 
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2.  Group Dynamics Theory
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, CEOs could easily defend the common 
practice of making loans to executives as an efficient form of 
compensation that took advantage of the psychological phenomenon 
known as the endowment effect.  The endowment effect is produced by 
loss aversion, the observation that people dislike losses more than they 
appreciate gains.272 That is, as Tversky and Kahneman have explained, 
“[T]he loss of utility associated with giving up a valued good is greater 
than the utility gain associated with receiving it.”273 As a result, people 
value things more once they own them. 
A famous classroom experiment conducted by Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler illustrates this proposition nicely.274 The authors 
provided one-third of the students with a coffee mug whose retail value 
was around $5.275 These students were then asked to value the mug.276 
The remaining students were told that they had a choice between a coffee 
mug and an amount of money, and were asked a series of questions 
designed to find out the point at which the students would choose the 
money over the mug.277 The first group of students, who were given a 
mug at the beginning, evaluated the sale of the mug as a loss of 
something they owned.278 The remaining students, who began the 
experiment with nothing, perceived the mug as a possible gain.279 As the 
endowment effect predicts, the students who already owned the mug 
valued it about twice as highly as those students who began in a neutral 
position.280 
The endowment effect teaches us that people are more reluctant 
to give something up than they are eager to gain it to begin with.  
Corporate loans may have taken advantage of this phenomenon to 
 
272 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:  A 
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1039, 1040-44 (1991) 
(discussing experiments that have validated the endowment effect, a result of loss 
aversion).  
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produce greater incentives.  The loans were ultimately forgiven if the 
employee remained with the company the requisite number of years.281 
As a result, the loans plus forgiveness were effectively the equivalent of 
a cash bonus for each year of employment, with one important 
difference:  the executives received the full amount of the loan in the 
first year.  Under the endowment effect, once the employees received the 
loan proceeds, they would value the amount more than if they were 
promised that amount for staying with the company in the future.  The 
threatened loss of the already-received retention bonus may have 
produced a stronger deterrent to premature departures than would a 
promised retention bonus.  This point is debatable, and depends on a 
number of factors.  For example, in many circumstances, the expenses to 
the corporation associated with having to pay the money up front (from 
loss of liquidity or because the loan was granted with below-market 
interest) may have outweighed any benefit from the endowment effect.  
But the arguments are sufficiently complex and uncertain to open the 
door to the impact of groupthink and social cascades. 
 
G.   Soft Landings for Failures
1.  Managerial Power Theory
Chief executives typically receive significant downside 
protection as part of their employment contracts.  In sharp contrast to 
most employees, who can be fired at the will of their employers, CEOs 
can usually be terminated only for “cause,” where “cause” is defined 
very narrowly to include only the most extreme bad behavior.282 In the 
unlikely even that the board does fire a CEO, the CEO’s employment 
contract generally calls for several years’ compensation as a severance 
payment.283 This multi-year period far exceeds the compensation 
typically granted to other employees and may approach the length of the 
underlying contract.284 If these arrangements are efficient, BF argue, 
then they should be granted to all employees.285 The reality that only 
 
281 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 116-17. 
282 Id., at 133 (listing commission of a felony, fraud, gross negligence, and refusal to 
follow board direction as some of the few actions that could constitute “cause” in a 
typical CEO employment contract). 
283 Id.  
284 Id. at 134 
285 Id. 
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senior officers receive such terms supports the argument that executive 
compensation is the result of captured boards and not an efficient market. 
 
2.  Group Dynamics Theory
While BF convincingly make the point that CEOs receive 
unusually favorable severance arrangements, this by itself does little to 
support their thesis that management has captured most public company 
boards.  Boards might grant such generous severance terms for the same 
reason that courts have conferred on senior management similarly 
generous protection from liability – the need for CEOs to take substantial 
risks.286 One of the bedrock principles of corporate finance is that 
shareholders want their corporations to invest in the projects with the 
highest expected returns, even if those projects also carry a great deal of 
risk.287 Because shareholders have diversified their investments, on 
average they will earn a greater return if each corporation pursues the 
possibilities with the highest potential yields.  Even though some of these 
investments will fail, those that succeed will more than make up for the 
loss.288 
Although risk-taking benefits shareholders, CEOs may prove 
risk-averse.  The CEO of a corporation whose high-risk, high-reward 
investment fails can take little consolation in the success of other 
corporations who pursue a similar strategy.  That CEO is likely to lose 
 
286 Delaware courts review actions by the board of directors and senior officers under 
the highly deferential business judgment rule.  As the Delaware Supreme Court has 
stated: 
The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free 
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors. The rule 
itself "is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Thus, 
the party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the 
presumption that its business judgment was an informed one. 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (internal citations omitted). 
287 See supra note 229. 
288 See Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law 
and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 
184-95 (2001) (explaining portfolio theory). 
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his or her job, perhaps because of the board’s hindsight bias289 or 
perhaps because the company itself becomes insolvent when the risk 
materializes.  Either way, a CEO strictly pursuing self-interest will likely 
take fewer risks than the company’s shareholders would like.  In order to 
induce the CEO to take more risks, the board may rationally offer, in 
advance, extremely generous downside protection.  Lower-level 
employees, in contrast, serve under the CEO’s direction.  They 
implement the CEO’s decisions, but do not generally make strategic 
decisions.  As a result, lower-level corporate employees do not need – 
and unsurprisingly rarely receive – the extensive protection granted to 
the CEO.    
A CEO who knows in advance that he or she will be generously 
compensated even for failure may feel more comfortable taking the high-
risk actions the company’s shareholders desire.  This argument does not 
apply to “gratuitous” post-termination payments, those made without a 
preexisting contractual obligation, since the compensation can only 
motivate CEOs who know in advance they will receive it.  But the sort of 
contract-based severance payments BF complain of may well be a 
perfectly rational inducement to risk-taking.  At a minimum, these 
arrangements are sufficiently defensible to pass muster for a groupthink 
board, or one subject to a social cascade. 
 
H.  Gratuitous Payments
1.  Managerial Power Theory
BF describe three types of payments boards commonly award to 
CEOs that appear gratuitous, that is, that the CEO’s employment contract 
does not require.290 These payments support BF’s theory, they contend, 
because a board bargaining at arms-length has no reason to give what is 
essentially a gift of additional compensation.291 These payments are 
different from bonus plans, which provide by contract for additional 
payments triggered by meeting certain performance goals.292 The 
 
289 Hindsight bias refers to people’s tendency to overestimate the odds of an event 
occurring ex ante once they know that the event did actually occur.  See Christine Jolls 
& Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 204 (2006). 
290 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 87-94. 
291 Id. at 94. 
292 Id. at 87.  
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gratuitous payments BF discuss represent compensation over and above 
the bonus payments required by the CEO’s employment contract. 
The first type of gratuitous payment BF document comes when 
CEOs are terminated.293 Boards dealing with their CEOs at arms-length 
should have no reason to offer extra compensation to CEOs whose poor 
performance motivates the board to fire them.  Yet BF assert that boards 
often make such payments, over and above any severance pay required 
by the CEO’s employment contract.294 
At first glance, such payments seem as baffling to managerial 
power theorists as they do to scholars who believe boards bargain with 
CEOs over their pay at arms-length.  A captive board would seem 
incapable of firing its captor, the CEO.295 Yet if a board did escape its 
bonds, why would it desire to shower the deposed executive with gifts? 
BF explain that boards grant gratuitous compensation to CEOs 
after firing them for two reasons.  First, far from escaping the CEO’s 
influence, the board feels the need to bribe the CEO to leave.296 Under 
BF’s theory, boards escape the CEO’s influence sufficiently to ask for 
the chief executive’s departure, but not to demand it.297 Second, the 
directors pay the terminated CEO to signal CEOs of other companies 
that they are not threatening, that they can be trusted to look after CEOs’ 
interests and should therefore be selected as directors of other 
corporations.298 Managerial Power therefore seems capable of 
explaining a phenomenon that Optimal Contracting cannot. 
Boards give CEOs the second type of gratuitous payment when 
their corporations are acquired.299 BF write that 27% of target boards 
grant their CEO a gratuitous bonus once the takeover is approved.300 
From an arms-length contracting perspective, it is difficult to understand 
why an independent board would pay the CEO a bonus under these 
 
293 Id. at 88-89. 
294 Id. 
295 BF explain terminations as resulting from outrage costs exceeding some level.  Id. at 
88. 
296 Id. at 89. 
297 This theory is less troubling than it might at first appear.  Although the board as a 
whole may be captive, presumably some directors would be more firmly influenced 
than others.  A divided board might well recognize that a CEO had performed so poorly 
that termination was necessary, yet prove unable to muster a majority to support 
replacement without the CEO’s acquiescence.   
298 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 89. 
299 Id. at 89-91. 
300 Id. at 90. 
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circumstances.  The CEO may or may not go on to work for the acquirer, 
but in neither case does this type of reward appear to benefit the target’s 
shareholders.  The board should pay the CEO only in order to induce 
better performance.  While the promise of a bonus might induce the CEO 
to try harder to get the best possible price for the target’s shareholders, 
any additional, surprise, payments cannot possibly have any effect on the 
CEO’s behavior.  The best argument Optimal Contracting adherents 
might make to explain this behavior is that since corporations have 
awarded such bonuses in the past, a CEO may anticipate this sort of 
reward for particularly hard work.  But presumably whatever effect a 
hoped for bonus might have would be much weaker than the motivation 
produced by a firm promise of a large reward for excellent results.  
Boards’ frequent – though hardly universal – awarding of bonuses 
without an advance promise makes little sense if we start from the 
assumption that boards act strictly in shareholders’ interests. 
BF conclude, perhaps a bit too quickly, that this behavior makes 
much better sense when one understands that CEOs have captured their 
directors.301 Boards grant CEOs these payments because CEOs ask for 
them, and perhaps because the directors feel uncomfortable that by 
agreeing to be acquired they are removing the CEO from power.302 
If CEOs’ power over the directors is rooted in their ability to 
grant board seats to the directors, though, it is difficult to understand why 
the board would offer additional payments at the very moment that 
power is terminated.  As BF themselves state, the target’s directors 
usually lose their positions when the company is purchased.303 Why, 
then, would the target’s CEO retain any influence over the board, when 
the directors have no realistic hope of any continuing reward? 
The answer may lie in the board’s need to persuade the CEO to 
consent to the acquisition in the first place.304 BF point out that acquirers 
often pay CEOs – either in cash or with a position in the company – in 
order to persuade the CEO to agree to the deal.305 Although BF do not 
seem to make this argument explicitly, if acquirers feel the need to 
placate the CEO to allow the transaction to proceed, perhaps targets’ 
boards feel the same way.   
 




305 Id. at 91-92. 
2006]                     GROUP DYNAMICS THEORY                        59
This explanation may prove susceptible to the same dilemma 
surrounding termination payments:  if the board is captive, how can it 
agree to the acquisition in the first place, much less negotiate the CEO’s 
bribe?  In this context, though, the problem seems more tractable.  While 
a CEO may be very reluctant to be fired, regardless of the size of the 
resulting severance payment, a chief executive may be far more willing 
to permit the company’s sale at a premium.   
Unlike a termination, which carries an unavoidable taint of 
failure and is very likely to damage the CEO’s reputation, the 
corporation’s sale at a premium can signal a remarkable success.  A CEO 
may therefore be not only willing but perhaps even eager to sell the 
company, provided sufficient compensation is offered for the lost 
position.  The captured board would then be left only with the role of 
agreeing to whatever payment the CEO demanded in exchange for 
permission to sell the company.  Managerial Power therefore offers a 
potential explanation for this phenomenon that is not easily explained by 
Optimal Contracting. 
The third category of gratuitous compensation cited by BF in 
support of their theory is retirement payments beyond those provided by 
the CEO’s employment contract.306 BF contend that corporations 
commonly provide extra-contractual retirement benefits to CEOs, 
generally making these arrangements at or very near the time the CEO 
retires.307 The authors point out that while the possibility of receiving 
these extra payments might induce a CEO to work harder during his or 
her tenure, well-designed option or bonus plans would likely fulfill this 
function more efficiently.308 CEOs can be expected to work harder for 
benefits the board contractually binds itself to award in exchange for 
excellent performance than for benefits the CEOs only hope the board 
will award them.   
Managerial Power, on the other hand, explains that captured 
boards see the CEO’s retirement as one last opportunity to express their 
appreciation for the CEO’s largesse.  Also, these benefits offer the 
additional advantage of being much less noticeable than cash payments 
such as salary and bonuses.  Under the current SEC disclosure rules, only 
the formula for calculating these benefits – not their cash value – must be 
 
306 Id. at 92-93. 
307 Id. at 92. 
308 Id. at 93. 
60                                         LAW REVIEW                                      [Vol. 
disclosed, and even this disclosure is omitted from the compensation 
tables where most of the CEO’s compensation is presented.309 
BF do not explain, however, why a captured board would 
continue to obey a CEO who is about to retire.  As I argued above in 
discussing acquisition payments,310 if the board’s capture is rooted in 
self-interest and the CEO’s power over the director nomination process, 
the point of the CEO’s departure ought to also signal the end of the 
CEO’s power over the board.  The board’s continuing fidelity at this 
juncture must find its explanation elsewhere.  BF themselves seem to 
acknowledge this point, by arguing that the payments in part stem from 
the board’s gratitude for past service and feelings of collegiality, rather 
than pure self-interest.311 This sort of emotional response by the 
directors, though, cannot fairly be described as managerial “power” 
derived from the CEO’s ability to grant a board seat. 
 
2.  Group Dynamics Theory
Managerial Power’s explanation of gratuitous payments seems 
troubling.  BF argue that corporations make gratuitous payments on three 
occasions:  when the board fires the CEO, when the corporation is 
acquired, and when the CEO retires.312 Under all three circumstances, 
the board is rewarding the CEO just as the CEO’s power over them is 
ending.  Once the CEO has been fired, or the company has been bought 
out, or the CEO has retired, the CEO will cease to have any influence 
over appointments to the board of directors.   
BF’s explanation of this anomaly – that the board must bribe the 
CEO to relinquish power – seems logically problematic, based on their 
premises.  If CEOs’ power stems from their ability to control 
appointments to the board, then why should a board that is about to fire 
its CEO – in the teeth of this power – grant the CEO a parting gift?  Is it 
really credible that the board needs to bribe the CEO to accept being 
 
309 Id. Note that the new rules proposed by the SEC would change this result by 
requiring disclosure of the increase in actuarial value in the year reported of any 
defined-benefit pension plan under the “All Other Compensation” column of the 
compensation tables.  This figure would also contribute to the tables’ “Total” column.   
See 71 FED. REG. 6542, 6552 (2006), also available at 
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-8655fr.pdf.  
310 See supra notes 303-305 and surrounding text. 
311 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at.93. 
312 Id. at 87-94. 
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fired?  CEOs who have the power to prevent their termination would 
presumably prefer to keep their jobs rather than accept a bribe to leave.  
Otherwise, they would retire, not be fired.  Similarly, in the takeover 
context, once the company has been purchased, the CEO’s power to 
appoint directors will end.  Knowing this, the directors should feel free to 
vote against the CEO’s wishes in accepting a takeover bid, since the vote 
itself will eliminate the CEO’s ability to retaliate against them.  There 
should therefore be no need to bribe the CEO to permit the board to act 
as it pleases in response to an offer to purchase the company.  This 
explanation works somewhat better, though, when we consider that 
takeover golden handshakes are often paid by the purchasing 
corporation.313 If the payment is the acquirer’s bribe and not the 
board’s, the theory holds together much better.  Then the payment is 
merely a recognition by the acquirer that the board is under the CEO’s 
thumb, and that gaining the CEO’s acquiescence is a necessary 
prerequisite to a friendly acquisition.  The bribery story has the most 
explanatory power in the retirement context, where the CEO is free to 
continue to work if the board refuses to grant the bribe, and would then 
remain in a position to replace the directors. 
The alternative explanation – that directors grant parting gifts to 
CEOs in order to signal their acceptability to other CEOs – also has 
difficulty explaining post-termination and takeover payments.  Under 
Managerial Power’s analysis, CEOs want the most docile directors they 
can find.314 Directors who fire their CEO – even if they then pay the 
departing CEO a great deal of money – can hardly expect to make the 
top of anyone’s appointments list.  They have demonstrated a capacity 
for regicide and are therefore tainted.  Golden handshakes may dissipate 
the taint to some degree, but surely the pool of board candidates offers 
plenty of potential directors with no taint at all.  In the takeover context, 
the CEO the directors should be most eager to please is the chief 
executive of the purchasing entity.  That person can hardly expect to 
rejoice that some of the target’s capital is leaking out just before the deal 
is consummated.  Perhaps CEOs of other companies will be reassured, 
 
313 Id. at 91-92 (discussing acquirer-paid “sweeteners”). 
314 As Warren Buffet has gibed about compensation committees in particular, “There is 
a tendency to put cocker spaniels on compensation committees, not Doberman 
pinschers.”  Keith Naughton et al., The Perk Wars:  As Jack Welch’s Retirement Deal 
Sparks an Investor Backlash, Perks Could Become the New Stock Options, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 30, 2002, at 44. 
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but again, these directors have shown that they will vote for an 
acquisition that displaces their CEO.  More obedient directors can no 
doubt be found.  The signal theory, like the bribery thesis, makes most 
sense when applied to CEO retirements.  The replacement CEO may take 
some comfort from knowing that the board is reliably generous, and may 
choose to keep the directors on for that reason. 
In all three contexts, groupthink – though not social cascades – 
may offer a better explanation.  Gratuitous payments are unlikely to be 
the result of a social cascade because there is there is little mystery about 
their inefficiency.  Board members therefore do not lack sufficient 
information to evaluate them.   
Groupthink, however, may provide a reasonable explanation for 
at least some of these payments.  Boards subject to groupthink are 
accustomed to following the CEO’s lead without much question.  The 
essence of groupthink is the refusal to consider conflicting arguments or 
evidence once the majority or the group leader has adopted a position.315 
Groupthink boards may therefore be highly susceptible to the suggestion 
that they should pay the CEO a bonus as a parting gift for a job well 
done when the CEO retires or the company is acquired, even if the CEO 
actually performed poorly.  This rationale is common in other familiar 
contexts, such as tipping in a restaurant in a strange city, and may 
therefore pass without much comment.  Although an outside, 
independent analysis would indicate that payments initiated after the 
CEO’s departure cannot motivate better performance, it is the nature of 
groups subject to groupthink that they do not perform such analyses.316 
In addition, as with Managerial Power, to the extent that takeover 
payments come from the acquirer, and not the target’s board, they may 
be explained as stemming from the buyer’s recognition that the CEO is 
the board’s leader.  Motivating the group leader to favor the offer is 
surely likely to improve the bidder’s chances. 
Groupthink’s explanation of post-termination bonuses is a bit 
more involved.  Although a board that fires its CEO may remain subject 
to groupthink, in the sense that its members may still self-censor 
dissenting voices, its leadership will necessarily move away from the 
CEO.  CEOs cannot be expected to lead the board to their own 
termination.  To explain why a groupthink board would choose to fire its 
CEO but also award the CEO a post-termination payment requires an 
 
315 See supra Part IIA.  
316 See supra notes 48-49. 
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understanding of where leadership is likely to shift.  One possibility is 
that the new leader is the incoming CEO.  If so, the new chief executive 
may want to set a precedent that even failed CEOs should be awarded 
lucrative parting bonuses.  It is more likely, though, that at least for a 
time, leadership will shift to the board member or members who led the 
effort to oust the CEO.  Since most board members are current, former, 
or hopeful future CEOs of other companies, they too may like the idea of 
setting a generous precedent. 
I.  Direct Evidence of Power’s Impact
The bulk of BF’s book is devoted to discussing indirect evidence 
of boards’ capture.  The heart of their argument is that the compensation 
methods in common use are far too inefficient to support the theory that 
boards are independent.317 Directors with the corporation’s interest at 
heart would use better devices, such as indexed options, that linked 
executives’ pay more closely to their performance.318 The preceding 
subsections have discussed the bulk of this evidence, as well as Group 
Dynamics Theory’s alternative explanation for the observed corporate 
behavior. 
But BF also provide somewhat more direct evidence that boards 
are captured.319 They posit that certain factors seem likely to make 
boards weaker and CEOs commensurately stronger.320 Some examples 
include the presence of antitakeover measures, such as poison pills; the 
absence or relative scarcity of large shareholders; interlocking directors, 
when one or more directors of one corporation also sit on the board of 
another corporation; boards that are relatively large; CEOs that also 
serve as chair of the board; and boards that have been appointed while 
the current CEO was in office.321 These factors correlate with higher 
CEO compensation, suggesting that managerial power can produce 
excessive compensation, perhaps through directorial capture.322 
317 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 87-185 (cataloguing the inefficient forms of 
compensation in common use). 
318 Id. at 140-46. 
319 Id. at 80-86. 
320 Id. at 80-84. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
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My own work supports the notion that managerial power can 
result in excessive compensation.323 Effects can have more than one 
contributing cause, however.  BF argue powerfully that executive pay in 
public corporations is structured poorly, and that managerial power over 
boards seems to intensify the use of inefficient compensation devices.  
Yet, as Steven Bainbridge has pointed out, even corporations with boards 
that appear relatively independent by conventional direct measures – 
such as those with one or more shareholders who own large blocks of 
stock. – still employ the same inefficient compensation methods.324 
Admittedly, none of BF’s independence factors directly measures board 
autonomy.  For example, institutional shareholders, who may own large 
blocks of a company’s stock, may not choose to exercise their influence, 
for a variety of reasons.325 Nevertheless, some public company boards 
must be more independent than others, yet nearly all public companies 
draw from the same pool of inefficient compensation structures.326 How 
can BF explain the prevalence of inefficient compensation even in 
corporations that enjoy a relative absence of managerial power? 
Two additional points trouble me about BF’s account of 
corporate governance that do not appear to have drawn critics’ attention.  
First, BF’s theory depends on directors’ willingness to sell their integrity 
for the price of a board seat.  Yet, as BF themselves point out, most 
board members are richly-paid executives of other companies.327 Why 
would managers earning millions or tens of millions of dollars a year feel 
compelled to take any action for the relatively paltry sum in the range of 
a hundred thousand dollars?  CEOs’ power over their boards seems fairly 
 
323 See Dorff, supra note 3, at 277-83 (presenting the results of an empirical test of 
power’s impact on executive compensation). 
324 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation:  Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1615, 1628-29 (2005). 
325 See Dorff, supra note 2, at 834-37 (explaining that institutional investors often face 
conflicts of interest that prevent them from monitoring corporations effectively and that 
popular investment strategies such as indexing sap institutional investors’ incentives to 
allocate resources to monitoring corporate governance). 
326 For example, stock options achieved nearly universal use among public companies 
during the 1990s.  See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock:  Equity-Based 
Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1367 
(2000) (stating that in 1997, the 200 largest companies had reserved more than 13% of 
their common shares to be used to compensate their managers). 
327 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 33 (41% of directors on compensation 
committees were executives in 2002, with an additional 26% retired former executives).  
See also Dorff, supra note 2, at 845. 
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weak if the only consequence of a director’s defiance is losing a position 
that accounts for an insignificant percentage of the director’s total 
income.  BF argue that directorships are also very prestigious, but CEOs 
of public companies already occupy positions that are more prestigious 
than directorships. 
Second, as behavioral economists have proven repeatedly, people 
are not pure rational actors who successfully maximize their individual 
utility.328 On the contrary, humans are subject to many consistent biases 
that interfere with their ability to achieve or even determine their most 
favored outcomes.329 Cultural and social influences also cause us to take 
actions that are not in our narrow self-interest, such as giving anonymous 
donations to charity.  Compounding these characteristics of individual 
decision-making are group decision-making phenomena that play an 
analogous role in collective decisions, as I have discussed at length 
above.330 Yet BF’s discussion of boards’ behavior largely ignores these 
insights in favor of an implicit model that seems to assume that groups 
will behave just like individuals, and that individuals always act in their 
financial best interest.331 A more complete account of boards’ behavior 
must also take into account the difference between individual and group 
decision-making, as I attempt to do in this Article. 
 
IV.  Exploring Solutions
So far, I have argued that Group Dynamics Theory may explain, 
either fully or partially, the executive compensation inefficiencies BF 
have identified.  In this section, I will briefly outline the type of solution 
that should be pursued to the problems unveiled by Group Dynamics 
Theory. 
 
328 The classic review of this literature is Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (discussing the literature 
demonstrating flaws in the rational actor model of human behavior). 
329 Id. Examples include the hindsight bias, the endowment effect, optimism bias, the 
availability heuristic, etc.). 
330 See infra Part II (describing groupthink and social cascades). 
331 BF do briefly describe the possible impact of individual psychological factors, but 
this discussion seems limited to the possibility that such factors might reinforce the 
preexisting power dynamic.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 31-34.  They also 
consider the possible effect of norms and mistakes.  Id. at 74-79.  BF never discuss 
social and psychological factors as an alternative root cause for the behavior they 
observe, nor do they ever consider group dynamic phenomena such as those I discuss 
here.  
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BF and other critics of corporate governance have advanced a 
reform agenda that targets what they view as the central problem of 
executive compensation:  managerial power over directors.332 They 
contend that the solution is, not surprisingly, less managerial power.333 
They hope to achieve this end through a series of remedies, the 
highlights of which include improving transparency and disclosure to 
shareholders, requiring shareholder approval of certain types of 
executive compensation plans, and, most famously and controversially, 
permitting large shareholders access to the corporate proxy ballot to 
nominate a competing slate of directors.334 
While BF’s plan has been criticized on a number of grounds, the 
underlying rationale appears to me to be essentially sound.335 If the 
problem with executive compensation is managerial power over 
directors, boosting shareholder power seems the best alternative.  
Reducing managerial power may not help very much, however, if the 
central problem lies in boards’ group dynamics.  The diagnosis provided 
by Group Dynamics Theory requires a very different cure than that 
called for by Managerial Power’s analysis.  Under Group Dynamics 
Theory, the solution lies not in strengthening the link between directors 
and shareholders but in redesigning boards’ decision-making processes.  
 
332 Id. at 189-216 (discussing possible remedies such as improving transparency, 
requiring shareholder approval and requiring corporations to place an alternative slate 
of board nominees on the corporation’s proxy form under some circumstances).  See 
also, e.g., Barris, supra note 2, at 99-100 (advocating greater involvement by both 
institutional shareholders and the courts ); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus 
Control:   The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 
1336-66 (1991) (outlining the regulatory changes necessary to encourage institutional 
investors to monitor management); Elson, supra note 66, at 981-87 (advocating greater 
stock ownership by directors and longer director terms); Detlev Vagts, Challenges to 
Executive Compensation:  For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 275-76 
(1983) (proposing more independent compensation committees, shareholder approval 
of compensation plans, and great court scrutiny). 
333 See supra note 332. 
334 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 189-216. 
335 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (arguing that the current regime of 
limited shareholder voting rights is efficient and should be preserved); Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic:  A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s 
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1769-76 (2006) 
(portraying the traditionalist perspective as opposing greater shareholder power 
because, inter alia, it would weaken managers’ ability to take risks). 
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It may bear repeating at this point that I am not attempting to 
displace BF’s reform proposals, but to supplement them.  The problems 
associated with public company executive compensation likely stem 
from more than one source, and must be attacked accordingly.  Reducing 
managerial power and improving boards’ group dynamics should prove 
compatible goals. 
 Researchers have investigated several different methods of 
improving group decision-making, particularly for groups subject to 
groupthink.  Less attention has been devoted to methods of breaking 
social cascades, perhaps in part because, as discussed above, most social 
cascades are fragile and easily disrupted by the introduction of new 
information.336 In this short space, I do not intend to advocate for one 
particular method or to advance a detailed blueprint for reform.  Instead, 
my goal is only to illustrate the type of solution that might prove 
effective. 
 
A.  Countering Groupthink
The key to combating groupthink is to introduce reasoned dissent 
into the discussion.337 Once alternatives are proposed and seriously 
considered, the consensus that drives groupthink is much harder to 
maintain.  Dissent can be generated either through the decision-making 
process or through the selection of the decision-makers.  I will discuss 
each of these approaches below.   
 
1.  Dissent Through Process
There are four processes that studies have demonstrated produce 
superior decisions to fully interacting groups.  The first process-driven 
method of creating conflict is Dialectical Inquiry.338 With this technique, 
 
336 See supra notes 119-120 and associated text. 
337 See Robert S. Dooley & Gerald E. Fryxell, Attaining Decision Quality and 
Commitment from Dissent:  The Moderating Effects of Loyalty and Competence in 
Strategic Decision-Making Terms, 42 ACAD. MANAGT. J. 389, 389 (1999) (dissent can 
neutralize groupthink); Sonnenfeld, supra note 71, at 111 (best performing boards have 
contentious discussions); David M. Schweiger, et al., Experiential Effects of Dialectical 
Inquiry, Devil's Advocacy, and Consensus Approaches to Strategic Decision Making,
32 ACAD. MANAGT. J.  745, 745-46  (1989) (building dissent into group process may 
resolve groupthink problems). 
338 See Schweiger, supra note 337, at 747 (describing Dialectical Inquiry). 
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the group is subdivided into two.339 The first group, tasked with 
synthesis, creates a proposal and provides it to the second group along 
with all supporting assumptions, arguments and information.340 The 
second group, tasked with antithesis, develops a counterproposal, based 
on different – though still plausible – assumptions.341 The two groups 
then meet and debate their separate recommendations until they reach 
agreement on the underlying assumptions and on a proposal based on 
those assumptions.342 
Devil’s Advocate is a second process that can introduce 
conflict.343 This technique involves dividing the decision-making group 
in two.344 One of these smaller groups examines the question at hand 
and develops a proposal.345 This proposing group relates the proposal, 
along with all supporting facts and assumptions, to the second, critiquing 
group.346 The critiquing group then attempts to find problems with both 
the proposal and the supporting facts and assumptions.347 The proposing 
group responds with a new proposal, along with new supporting 
assumptions (and possibly new facts), that attempts to address the issues 
identified by the critiquing group.348 This process continues until both 
groups are satisfied with the resulting proposal, and the supporting 
assumptions.349 
A third method is the Nominal Group Technique (“NGT”).350 
NGT creates an unconventional and highly structured meeting.351 The 
group’s members remain silent at the start of the meeting.352 A group 













350 This technique was invented by Andre L. Delbecq and Andrew H. Van de Ven.  See 
ANDRE L. DELBECQ, ET AL., GROUP TECHNIQUES FOR PROGRAM PLANNING: A GUIDE 
TO NOMINAL GROUP AND DELPHI PROCESSES 7-8 (1975). 
351 Id. 
352 Id. 
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down his or her ideas for solutions.353 After everyone has finished 
writing, the members take turns sharing one idea from their list with the 
group.354 The facilitator writes each idea down as it is stated on a 
whiteboard or screen projection so that the members can see all the 
suggestions.355 The group does not discuss any of the ideas until 
everyone has exhausted their individual lists of proposals.356 At that 
point, each idea is discussed in turn.357 Once all the ideas have been 
analyzed, each member rates or ranks the ideas privately, in writing.358 
The solution that receives the highest rating or ranking from the group 
becomes the group’s choice.359 
The fourth and final formal decision-making method I will 
discuss here is the Delphi Technique.  Unlike the other three methods, 
with the Delphi Technique the group’s members do not interact with one 
another directly.360 Instead, they each provide written opinions, which 
are often anonymous.361 The group’s leader or facilitator then responds 
to the reports by providing requested information, posing challenges 
from another member’s analysis, or by reconstituting the question.362 
The members then reconsider their views and write another written 
report.363 This process repeats for as many rounds as the group leader 
determines.364 Eventually, either the group reaches agreement through 
this process, or the leader makes a decision based on the group’s input.365 
These four methods attack groupthink in two different ways.  









360 See Delbecq, supra note 350 at 10-11; Stephen A. Stumpf, et al., Designing Groups 
for Judgmental Decisions, 4 ACAD. MANAGT. REV. 589, 592 (1979). 
361 See Delbecq, supra note 350 at 10-11; Stumpf, supra note 360, at 592; Cass R. 
Sunstein, Group Judgments:  Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets,
80 N.Y.U.L.REV. 962, 1018-19 (2005). 
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through role-play.366 Dialectical Inquiry’s antithesis group should feel 
free of the conformity pressures that cause groupthink because the 
members have taken on the role of dissenters tasked with creating an 
alternative proposal.  Their success is measured not by being seen as 
correct (which too often may mean agreeing with the majority or with 
the group’s leaders), but by advancing a reasonable alternative and 
defending it intelligently.   
Devil’s Advocate similarly creates a safe space for dissenting 
voices by assigning a sub-group the role of critiquing the proposal.  
Again, the “devils” are likely to feel comfortable pointing out flaws in 
the majority’s plan because they have not just been invited but assigned 
to critique the proposal.367 The group’s perception of their effectiveness 
will rise with the quality of their criticism. 
 The Nominal Group Technique and the Delphi Technique attack 
groupthink by requiring members to commit to positions before they 
know their colleagues’ views.368 NGT requires group members to 
engage in private brainstorming and to reveal the product of that 
brainstorming before any discussion of the resulting ideas takes place.369 
As a result, members cannot engage in self-censorship based on their 
colleagues’ expressed views.  Once their ideas and positions are public, 
it becomes psychologically more difficult for adherents of minority 
positions to recant and adopt the majority’s view.  In addition, NGT 
provides an opportunity for private voting after the discussion, to allow 
group members to express a dissenting view without fear of reputation 
consequences or reprisals.370 
The Delphi Technique achieves the same end by preventing the 
group members from ever interacting directly.371 Participants will learn 
their colleagues’ views after exchanging the first round of reports, but 
here again, committing to their own positions in writing first should 
 
366 See Sunstein, supra note 361, at 1015-16 (“Those assuming the role of devil's 
advocate will not face the reputational pressure that comes from rejecting the dominant 
position within the group; they have been charged with doing precisely that. And 
because they are asked to take a contrary position, they are freed from the informational 
influences that can lead to self-silencing.”). 
367 Id. 
368 See supra notes 350-359 and 360-365 and associated text (describing Nominal 
Group Technique and Delphi Technique, respectively). 
369 See supra notes 350-359 and associated text (describing Nominal Group Technique). 
370 Id. 
371 See supra notes 360-365 and associated text (describing Delphi Technique). 
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make them more resistant to conformity pressures.  Keeping the process 
anonymous should help even more by protecting group members from 
reputation costs that may result from advancing unconventional or 
unpopular ideas.372 
These techniques are not merely theoretically effective.  Study 
after study has confirmed that groups using these methods make better 
decisions than the fully interactive groups that typify corporate boards’ 
decision-making processes.373 
2.  Dissent Through Group Composition
Constructing diverse groups may offer an alternative method of 
combating groupthink.  Janis argued that people with similar 
backgrounds and experiences – not to mention races, religions, and 
ethnicities – are more likely to form tightly cohesive groups.374 This 
idea has strong intuitive appeal.  Individuals who have more in common 
seem more likely to form friendships and to care more about one 
another’s good opinion.  The result may well be a group culture that is 
reluctant to oppose any apparent consensus, for fear of appearing 
contentious, disruptive, or foolish.  Ensuring that each group contains 
many people of diverse experiences should help protect against 
groupthink. 
 The empirical data on this point, however, is mixed.  While some 
studies support the theory that diverse groups make better decisions, 
other research indicates that homogeneous groups function equally 
well.375 Diversifying corporate boards, if costless, should certainly be 
pursued.  To the extent diversification is costly, however, it may be 
preferable to await more conclusive research.   
 
372 See Sunstein, supra note 361, at 1018. 
373 See supra note 337 (citing some examples). 
374 See Janis, supra note 15, at 250. 
375 Compare J.W. Dyson, et al., Group Composition, Leadership Orientation, and 
Decisional Outcomes, 7 SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR 114 (1976) (homogeneity produces 
groupthink); L.R. Hoffman, Group Problem Solving in  LEONARD BERKOWITZ,
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 2 99-132 (1965) (same); 
with Won-Woo Park, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 21 J. ORG. BEHAV. 873, 
882 (2000) (homogeneity did not produce groupthink); Mark Schafer & Scott Crichlow, 
Antecedents of Groupthink, 30 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 415 (1996) (same). 
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 An alternative method of bringing a type of diversity into the 
boardroom involves changing the boards’ sources of information, rather 
than the characteristics of the board members themselves.  We might 
adopt Carrie Menkel-Meadow’s “Consensus Building Processes” to the 
corporate boardroom.376 Menkel-Meadow argues that Consensus 
Building Processes offer the possibility of “more creative and better 
substantive solutions to problems, where information is shared across 
disciplines and approaches from outside of the conventional frame are 
considered.”377 The essence of Consensus Building Processes is the 
inclusion of most or all affected groups in the discussion, and sometimes 
in the decision itself.378 Solutions developed through these processes 
may therefore be easier to implement, since most or all affected 
constituencies are consulted.379 
As applied to the corporate context, Consensus Building 
Processes may involve introducing a more diverse range of views by 
inviting other corporate constituencies into the process.  Representatives 
of major customers, suppliers, and affected communities might speak 
directly to the board to address their particular concerns regarding some 
major corporate decision.  Employees might be represented by a union 
representative, to the extent the corporation is unionized and the union 
fairly represents the company’s workers.  Alternatively, the corporation 
might provide its employees with anonymous questionnaires 
administered by a neutral outside agency, to promote honesty and 
remove the fear of management retaliation.   
Even if the board itself is homogeneous, Consensus Building 
Processes, far from reinforcing consensus in this context, might 
deconstruct the reflexive agreement characteristic of groupthink by 
undermining previously accepted assumptions.  Consensus Building 
Processes have been used successfully to resolve a variety of decision-
making contexts, including water use disputes, environmental clean-up 
conflicts, NIMBY (“Not In My Back Yard”) issues such as airport siting, 
strategic planning, and international peace efforts, among many 
 
376 I am indebted to Carrie Menkel-Meadow for this possibility.  For a more detailed 
explanation of Consensus Building Processes, including its origins in the work of 
Jürgen Habermas, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative 
Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 354-366 (2004-2005). 
377 Id. at 360. 
378 Id. at 361. 
379 Id. at 360. 
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others.380 I am unaware, however, of any scientific study measuring the 
efficacy of Consensus Building Processes in alleviating groupthink.  
Nevertheless, Consensus Building Processes appear to possess great 
potential and are well worth studying further. 
 
B.  Dissolving Social Cascades
Most social cascades are relatively easy to disrupt by providing 
new, credible information that indicates the cascades’ selection is 
incorrect.381 Perhaps because cascades are generally considered to be 
fragile, researches have spent little time investigating methods of 
collapsing cascades that prove resilient.382 In contrast to most social 
cascades, executive compensation cascades are predicted to be relatively 
durable.  Cascades collapse because new information comes to light that 
exposes the objective invalidity of the cascade’s choice.  In the case of 
our first year law student class, the cascade may break when the 
professor tells the class the correct answer.383 
Executive compensation cascades are not similarly vulnerable to 
new information.  The relevant question with executive compensation is 
whether corporations are paying their executives more than they are 
worth.  Without a well-functioning market or some alternative objective 
measure of value, there appears little likelihood of any information 
appearing that would shift boards’ perceptions of executives’ value as a 
whole.  This is not to say that a particular executive might not be 
devalued by new data.  A board that learned the company’s chief 
executive had embezzled company funds, for example, would certainly 
lower its estimation of the executive’s worth.  But this type of 
information will tell the broader market essentially nothing about the 
 
380 Id. at 363-64. 
381 See Bikhchandani, supra note 17, at 158 (discussing means of disrupting cascades). 
382 Id. (arguing that cascades are fragile).  But see Angela A. Hung & Charles R. Plott, 
Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-
Rewarding Institutions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1508, 1517-18 (2001) (finding that 
majority rule counteracted social cascades so long as only the group’s decision counted 
in determining rewards and there was no individual benefit for voting for the correct 
result).  Because the relevant group for our purposes is the group of publicly traded 
corporations, majority rule is not a helpful device to aid in setting executive 
compensation.  
383 I acknowledge that there may never be a true objective answer to the question of 
whether a court case was decided correctly.  It is enough for my purposes here that the 
first-year students will likely take the professor’s response as objectively correct. 
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value of leadership in general.  The salary that an honest executive 
should command would remain largely a mystery, subject to a social 
cascade. 
Other than introducing new information, the only apparent 
method of dissolving a social cascade is to isolate each board from the 
decisions made by other corporations.384 Directors who remained 
ignorant of the decisions of their peer companies could not be influenced 
by a perception that other corporations possessed more information 
about the value of corporate leadership.  Isolation might therefore break 
the cascade caused by compensation consultants.385 Quarantined boards 
might peg compensation purely on the basis of internal factors, such as a 
percentage of the company’s profits, or a multiple of the lowest paid 
worker’s salary, rather than attempting to exceed the average amount 
paid by similar companies. 
This approach may not prove feasible.  Directors of public 
corporations are often chief executive officers themselves, so they will 
have at least their own pay to use as a benchmark.386 Moreover, 
directors tend to belong to the same social networks, and may therefore 
garner informal knowledge about compensation practices at other large 
corporations.387 Worst yet, federal securities regulation requires 
extensive – if not complete or clear – disclosure of executive 
compensation.388 And even if that requirement were eliminated, the 
financial press would no doubt remain devoutly interested in what CEOs 
earn, and would work hard to discover and publish at least some version 
of the truth. 
Even if the feasibility issues could somehow be dealt with, 
isolating the directors from this sort of information risks worsening the 
 
384 See Bikhchandani, supra note 17, at 163 ("[I]t would be socially most advantageous 
if one could isolate different groups of decisionmakers, and then disclose their actions 
simultaneously."). 
385 See supra notes 112-118 and associated text (discussing the role played by 
compensation consultants). 
386 See supra note 327.   
387 While it is difficult to document the degree to which directors socialize together, 
some work has been done to measure the extent to which directors are linked simply by 
virtue of sitting on more than one board.  See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Small World of 
the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001, 1 STRATEGIC ORG. 301-26 (2003) (finding 
that in 1999, 97.4% of all corporations in his sample group of 811 Fortune 1000 firms 
could be linked through overlapping directorships to Chase Manhattan in four steps or 
fewer). 
388 See 17 C.F.R. §229.402 (2001). 
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capture problems unveiled by Managerial Power theorists.389 A captured 
board might use its forced ignorance as an excuse for awarding excessive 
pay to its chief executive.  Captured boards might defend excessive 
compensation by arguing that the pay seemed justified based on internal 
factors, and the directors were required to ignore external benchmarks 
that might otherwise have raised a red flag. 
While barring disclosure of executive compensation may prove 
both infeasible and undesirable, excluding compensation consultants 
from the process may weaken the social cascade’s power.  Although 
directors are likely to have some information about peer companies’ 
compensation practices, that sort of rumor-based knowledge will likely 
lack the impact of a comparison chart showing the company’s CEO 
woefully below the average pay of “comparable” corporations.390 
Perhaps consultant-deprived directors would perform a comprehensive 
analysis on their own using SEC filings, but this seems unlikely given 
the current ethos of public company directors.  It feels counterintuitive to 
attempt to dissolve a social cascade by depriving individuals of 
information, but that may prove the best available option in the case of 
executive compensation.   
 
Conclusion
I have argued that Group Dynamics Theory provides an 
alternative or contributing explanation for the observed inefficiencies in 
public company executive compensation.  The evidence for my claim 
comes largely from psychological studies of group dynamics.  While the 
phenomena I have discussed are well-documented and appear to explain 
corporate practices well, they provide only indirect evidence of the 
problem’s root cause.  Theorists who study executive compensation – 
regardless of which theory they believe –study board behavior indirectly, 
by examining the results of board decision-making.  To my knowledge, 
there has been no research employing direct empirical observations of 
directors’ behavior in and out of the boardroom.   
Theorists can learn a great deal from studying the effects of 
boards’ decision-making.  But those effects are and will remain subject 
to varied interpretations unless and until we can observe boards directly.  
Directors may be understandably reluctant to be studied this way, and 
 
389 See supra Part I (describing the problems of captured boards). 
390 See Dorff, supra note 3, at 267; Yablon, supra note 108, at n.5. 
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direct observations pose numerous practical difficulties.  Some of these 
challenges including meeting the corporation’s need for confidentiality 
while maintaining scientific openness; persuading directors that such 
studies are worthwhile; and avoiding the risk that the act of observation 
will change directors’ behavior.  Nevertheless, these obstacles must be 
overcome if we are ever to gain a sufficiently definite understanding of 
corporate governance dynamics to achieve effective regulatory reform.  
 
